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Abstract
Dealer Networks in Over-The-Counter (OTC) Financial Markets
by
Richmond Kyei-Fordjour
Adviser: Professor Christos I. Giannikos
This dissertation consists of three chapters and conducts methodological and empirical stud-
ies of dealer trading networks in an Over-the-Counter (OTC) financial market. Several papers
have studied trading frictions in Over-the-Counter (OTC) financial markets and developed
various equilibrium models including ones that reflect strategic behavior and imperfect com-
petition driving the trading frictions. So far, these studies only calibrate the models they
build and/or conducte comparative statics on them, but none performs exhaustive econo-
metric estimation of the endogenous model parameters.
In Chapter 1, I develop a methodology for directly estimating the endogenous parame-
ters of an interdealer trading network. As is the case generally with networks, the adjacency
matrix expresses the various associations that exist in the network as a whole and plays a
central role in analyses of the network. The model chosen for this exercise is not an excep-
tion in this regard; it is a model of strategic trading within an OTC dealer network, where
information asymmetries arise by virtue of each risk-neutral dealer having private, as well as
common, information about the valuation of the single divisible traded asset. The adjacency
matrix of this model is found to play a central role in how information asymmetries drive
information diffusion during price discovery in the model. The central theme of the method-
ology developed in this chapter to directly estimate endogenous parameters is the invertibility
of the network’s adjacency matrix, and this is shown mathematically to be feasible in the gen-
eral sense. Bayesian inference by Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo (a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo
iv
method) using a No-U-Turn-Sampler for tuning is proposed for estimating the parameters
of the model. A review of the Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) method in general,
and in particular, the Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo using No-U-Turn-Sampling (HMC-NUTS)
inference technique is then provided.
In Chapter 2, I further examine the mechanism giving rise to information asymmetry
in the model presented in Chapter 1. Other mechanisms that could also cause information
asymmetries to occur in financial transactions, where agents are not necessarily risk-neutral,
are reviewed. Subsequently, an empirical component is formulated to augment the model
of Chapter 1 and provide an estimation framework within which convergence to equilibrium
could be assessed quantitatively. Further, an approach by which the model could be har-
nessed to analyze repeated trading in the same, or different, asset instead of just the single
divisible asset of Chapter 1 is presented. Both the model augmentation and the approach for
repeated trading using the network lead to a hypothesis each, which could be assessed using
the results of an empirical inquiry. Finally, a hierarchical probability model is formulated for
use in conducting Bayesian inference using the augmented model developed in this chapter.
Chapter 3 utilizes the model presented in Chapter 1 and augmented in Chapter 2 to
study interdealer trading in the Municipal bonds market. In Chapter 3, the approach for re-
peated trading presented in Chapter 2 is used for the empirical study of the Municipal bonds
market. Also, the hierarchical probability model formulated in Chapter 2 is implemented
using the CmdStan interface of the Stan probabilistic programming language to obtain a
posterior distribution for each of the over 2 million estimated parameters. The results of the
estimation are then analyzed to reveal dealers’ strategic behavior in the Municipal bonds
OTC market and provide an assessment of the extent to which private information trad-
ing pertains in the Municipal bonds market, while also characterizing how the equilibrium
presented in Chapter 1 is attained.
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Chapter 1
Trading Network and Methodology for Estimating its
Endogenous Parameters
1.1 Introduction
Trading frictions exist in markets for financial assets, irrespective of whether the market
venue is centralized or decentralized. A large share of transactions in modern-day financial
markets take place in decentralized markets: the Over-the-counter (OTC) markets. In OTC
markets, trades occur through bilateral transactions among traders. One important source
of trading friction in OTC markets is imperfect competition. Imperfect competition in
OTC markets implies that traders are not price-takers, rather their own actions affect the
equilibrium prices at which they trade, and this phenomenon arises as a consequence of the
bilateral nature of trading in an OTC market. This means traders’ actions create price impact
and have implications for liquidity and price discovery in these markets. Consequently, there
is a strong need for traders to be strategic when they trade in OTC markets.
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Various studies have examined traders’ behavior in OTC markets, by developing theo-
retical models, conducting comparative statics analyses using these models, and/or calibrated
these models to various effects. However, none of these studies so far has directly estimated
the endogenous parameters of an OTC trading network. Because these parameters serve to
fully characterize the interplay among traders’ behaviors within the OTC trading network,
being able to directly estimate them would enable us to fully characterize the strategic be-
havior of traders within the OTC trading network. The inherently complex nature of the
models characterizing OTC trading have apparently prevented direct econometric estima-
tion of the endogenous parameters in these models. So I ask the following questions: can a
direct econometric estimation of the endogenous parameters of an OTC trading network be
performed? What intractabilities would have to be overcome in order to accomplish such a
goal? What kind of tools would be needed to implement such a solution?
Networks in general reveal the patterns of interconnectedness that exist within them-
selves through the adjacency matrix, which is a matrix that encodes who is connected to
which others within the network. To further advance the inquiry of this chapter, I harness
the structure of an adjacency matrix to develop a methodology for directly estimating the
endogenous parameters of a model of strategic behavior in an OTC trading network, and
prove that this methodology is mathematically feasible in general. I also propose an approach
for implementing the estimation methodology.
Previous studies on OTC trading have invariably recognized that the trading coun-
terparties must be found in some fashion, and two approaches to thinking about how the
counterparties are found have emerged. One approach takes the view that investors setting
out to trade for their portfolios randomly search for trading counterparties until they find
matching counterparties for the trades in which they wish to engage. The other approach
takes the view that trading relationships are not found through random searches, but rather
trading relationships pre-exist and are re-used by market participants when they need to
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engage in trading transactions. The second view emphasizes the strategic nature of the
bilateral trading interactions in OTC markets more than the first, whereas the first empha-
sizes the dynamics of how the trading process in OTC markets evolve more than the second.
My inquiry adopts the second view, for the reason that it provides a natural framework for
studying the strategic behavior of traders in OTC markets.
The next section reviews the literature; after that, section 1.3 presents the model of
strategic trading in OTC markets adopted for this study; section 1.4 derives a form of the
model presented in 1.3 that can be used for estimating the endogenous parameters; section
1.5 describes Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC), the Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo, and the
No-U-Turn-Sampler (NUTS), a machinery that can be used in automated estimation of
posterior distributions in Bayesian inference; and, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Recently, there has been a growing body of literature that studies trading frictions in OTC
markets and provide theoretical foundations for analyzing market microstructure issues such
as liquidity and price discovery. So far, two main conceptual approaches to analyzing trading
in OTC markets have emerged. One approach takes the perspective that an investor who
needs to implement investment decisions for his or her portfolio embarks on a search to find
a matching counterparty with whom to trade. The other strand takes the approach that
there are pre-existing relationships in OTC markets that result in the formation of trading
networks through which agents trade. Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), (henceforth,
DGP), study the OTC market microstructure using a search model that follows the Diamond
(1982) coconuts model. In the DGP model, trade occurs as a consequence of heterogeneity
of investor types, which arises from some fundamental need to own, or divest holdings of,
the traded asset. Liquidity needs can drive an investor to want to sell, making that investor
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a low-type in the DGP model; on the other hand, hedging needs can drive an investor to
want to own the same asset, making that investor a high-type. The different investor types
may trade directly with each other, or indirectly through an intermediary such as a Market-
maker. This heterogeneity, and the proportions of each type in the OTC marketplace –
as well as market power of agents – drives the trading dynamics in the DGP model. In
equilibrium, Bid prices, Ask prices, and Bid-ask spreads are derived to endogenously depend
on the parameters that drive the dynamics of the trading interactions. Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009), (henceforth, LR), extends the DGP model from having agents hold a discrete – 0 or
1 – quantity of the traded asset to having them hold asset positions that have continuous
distributions. By this approach, LR produces results that seek to explain how investors can
change their asset holding allocations to mitigate the effects of trading frictions on asset prices
and trade volumes. Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015), (henceforth, LRW), formulates
a model that nests the salient features of DGP and LR, while additionally provisioning
for the observation that dealers provide two-sided markets to their clients, and that these
clients through their search activities gather and incorporate the information they obtain
from dealers into making ex-poste decisions about trading. Whereas the search-and-match
approach provides a dynamic treatment for analyzing the OTC market microstructure, it
disregards the fact that investors may, and actually do, form trading relationships which
persist across time and are recurrently used for trading.
The second strand of the OTC market microstructure literature focuses more on the
strategic nature of the bilateral trading interactions and less on the dynamic evolution of
OTC markets as reflected particularly in LRW in the search-and-match approach to OTC
microstructure analysis. This second strand characterizes OTC transactions in a static set-
ting and rests on the notion that trading relationships persist and result in the formation
of trading networks. In contrast to the random matching of investors to their trading coun-
terparties, the main feature of this second approach is that trading relationships are not
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random but preexist. Babus and Kondor (2018), (henceforth BK), study the OTC market
using a model of interdealer trading where the traders interact within preexisting trading
networks. The links within the trading network imbue information within the economy and
serve as a medium by which information about traded securities diffuse during the price
discovery process. In the BK model, information diffusion through the trading links within
the interdealer network is the primary mechanism by which equilibrium prices are realized.
Consequently, the equilibrium reflects each dealer’s understanding of how her own private
information affects the equilibrium price within the context of the other dealers’ strategies.
This understanding gives rise to endogenously developed information asymmetries within the
trading network. The BK model follows from the Vives (2011) formulation of sellers com-
peting strategically to supply goods about which they receive private signals, and the Vives
model itself is a variant of the Kyle (1989) model but incorporates private information. Kyle
(1989) is a derivation that uses Nash equilibrium in demand functions to propose a solution
to the so-called schizophrenia problem in rational competitive equilibrium models, in which
the participation of individual agents in the equilibrium dynamics is assumed to not have
any impact on the final equilibrium. To resolve the schizophrenia problem, Kyle’s formula-
tion incorporated imperfect competition to allow agents’ participation to influence the final
equilibrium, so that agents are no longer price-takers but rather have price-impact in equi-
librium. This imperfect competition gives rise to the information asymmetries endogenously
formed within a trading network in the BK model.
Characterizing imperfect competition by price impact and harnessing the notion of the
Kyle’s Lambda, Malamud and Rostek (2017) generalize market structures, from centralized
to decentralized exchanges, to characterize conditions under which imperfect competition
arising from centralized or decentralized market structures could enhance efficiencies and
welfare in risk allocation. Generally, the literature on OTC trading networks has identified
that centrality, or the absence of it, for nodes within a trading network impacts trading
5
frictions. In addition to BK, Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017), (henceforth, HNS),
Weller (2013) and Zhong (2014), have all found that centrality has special significance for
trading costs in OTC markets. HNS built a real-world OTC network for the Securitization
market and studied the properties of this network, developed an equilibrium model to explain
centrality discounts and premiums, and then estimated a fixed-effects regression to calculate
spreads to compare with what their theoretical model predicted. Similarly, Hendershott, Li,
Livdan, and Schurhoff (2017), (henceforth, HLLS), studied a real-world OTC network for
the Corporate bonds market, HLLS modeled the OTC trade data directly, and thereafter
proceeded to assemble components from various equilibrium models to explain its model of
the data. The HLLS approach is the closest, so far, to estimating the equilibrium parameters
of a model of OTC trading frictions; HLLS’s approach specializes, however, to dealer-client
networks, and it is used to ultimately study insurers as clients interacting with market-makers
in the Corporate bonds market.
In an attempt to unify the two main strands of literature on price discovery in OTC
markets, Neklyudov (2017) suggests that core-peripheral trading networks occur as a result
of endogenous specialization of search-and-match in OTC markets. In all of the foregone,
only HLLS has attempted to show how real-world data may be applied to estimate the
equilibrium parameters – and the goal of this paper is demonstrate how this may be done.
1.3 Model of Strategic Interdealer Trading in OTC Network
In this section, I provide a brief conceptual description of the strategic behavior of trading
in OTC markets by using BK’s equilibrium model. To achieve this goal, I describe the main
features of the model in relation to the strategic behavior of the agents in the model. I
subsequently hone the discussion of the BK model into the estimation problem studied in
this work. The full details of the model’s derivation can be found in Babus and Kondor
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(2018).
In the BK model, trade counter-parties in an OTC trade are risk-neutral dealers who
serve investor clients. The model assumes that dealers in an economy trade an asset of fixed
supply. The valuation of the traded asset is expressed in two parts: one part represents
a common view, Θ, shared by all the dealers in the economy; and, the second part is
each dealer i’s own independent but uncertain view of the asset’s value, ηi. This second
component to the asset’s valuation is meant to capture heterogeneity among dealers’ utility
for the traded asset. Hence, each dealer has a valutation of the asset expressed by θi =
Θ + ηi. This valuation is observed via a signal si with observation error εi. Consequently,
si = θi + εi = Θ + ηi + εi. To express the notion that dealers’ valuations have a common and
an independent component, θi is expressed as a random variable with mean 0 and variance
σ2 and is split into the independent normally distributed random variables Θ ∼ N(0, ρσ2)
and ηi ∼ N(0, (1 − ρ)σ2), so that ρ expresses the degree of dependence among dealers’
valuations of the asset. εi ∼ N(0, ζσ2) is also independent of θi and ζ encodes the degree
of observation error present relative to the actual signal to be observed. This is the same
information structure of Vives (2011). Note that ρ in this context expresses the square of
the usual correlation coefficient.
Let (g, E) represent a graph with a set of nodes g connected by a set of edges E. The
entire trading network of the OTC marketplace can be represented by the graph (g, E); the
nodes of this graph will represent the individual dealers within the network, and the edges
will represent the persistent trading relationships that exist among the dealers within the
network. If dealer i has trading relationships with a number of other dealers forming a
subset gi, where gi ⊆ g and Ei ⊆ E, then the network represented by (gi, Ei) ⊆ (g, E) is
called dealer i’s trading network. Each dealer i’s demand schedule, representing his trading
strategy in a trade with dealer j ∈ gi on the bilateral trading network link ij ∈ Ei, is
given by equation (1.1). It is worth noting that equation (1.1) is of the form of the demand
7








ziikpik − pij) (1.1)
pgi is a vector in RI that contains prices for each bilateral trading link ij ∈ Ei within dealer
i’s network, where I = |gi|.
tiij is dealer i’s trading intensity on the link ij
yi is the weight dealer i places on his own private signal, si, of the asset’s value
ziik is the weight dealer i places on the information he derives from his trading activities on
the link ik ∈ Ei
pik is the price of the traded asset revealed on the bilateral link ik
The ziik’s and z
k
ik’s form key parameter pairs that influence how information diffuses
through the network over each link ik ∈ E. The derivation of the estimation methodology
of this chapter hones in on the essence and structure of the parameter pairings z
{i,k}
ik for
each bilateral link within the universal OTC trading network under consideration. It is
worth mentioning that determining these parameter pairings be used to construct a weighted
digraph to represent the balance of how information flows through the trading network
(see Jackson (2008, p. 40-41)). In addition to having a demand schedule as described by
equation (1.1), each dealer has price-sensitive customers he serves who are exogenous to
the trading network constructed in this model. Let β be the general slope of the demand
curve and (1 + µij) be the markups that the dealers on the link ij are able to charge their
exogenous customers, then the exogenous customer demand is characterized in this model
by β(1 + µij)pij if pij is the price at which the market clears on the link ij. Note that β < 0
and µij ≥ 0. Let βij = β(1+µij), then the market clearing condition on the bilateral trading
8





j;pgj) + βijpij = 0 (1.2)
The vector Qi(si;pgi) = (Q
i
ij(s
i;pgi))j∈gi is in RI and represents the set of demand quantities
that dealer i wishes to trade with each of the counterparties in his network (gi, Ei) at the
prices contained in the vector pgi . The exogenous demand term also serves the purpose of
ensuring that the market clears in the bilateral transaction, which is absent a Walrasian auc-
tioneer. Dealers in the BK model are risk-neutral and they solve the following maximization
problem to produce a linear Nash Equilibrium in demand functions, which is also referred










Solving the maximization problem in equation (1.3), subject to the market clearing condition
in equation (1.2), together with the posited form of the demand function in equation (1.1),















i|si,pgi)− pij) = qiij (1.5)
Let the equilibrium conditional expectations E(θi|si,pgi) be represented by ei. The equilib-
rium expectations ei represent the posterior beliefs of dealers engaged in an OTC transaction,
and the equilibrium prices and quantities depend directly on them. These expectations still
remain unknown, thus the demand function still remains to be solved for. The conventional
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approach would imply solving a fixed-point problem in the space of N x N matrices for a
network containing N dealers in order to determine the coefficients in the posited demand
function in equation (1.1). Instead of solving a fixed-point problem, BK use a methodolog-
ical innovation called the Conditional Guessing Game to instead solve for the equilibrium
posterior beliefs. BK prove that their solution converges to the solution from a full-blown
fixed-point approach. The equilibrium demand functions are then constructed from the
equilibrium posterior beliefs thereafter. In BK’s equilibrium,
ei = ȳ






























ei represents the equilibrium belief of trader i, egi represents a vector containing the equilib-
rium beliefs, ei, of the traders in trader i’s network.
1.4 Estimation Methodology
The equilibrium belief of each dealer i, as shown in equation (1.6) above, can be written for










e = (I − z̄)−1ȳ⇀s = U−1ȳ⇀s (1.7)
Where
⇀
e is an N -column vector of ei’s.
ȳ is a N x N diagonal matrix with ȳi’s on its diagonal.
⇀
s is an N -column vector of si’s.
z̄ is a N x N matrix with zeros on its diagonal and, zij = zij
i and zji = zij
j in its off-diagonal
locations; the conflation zji
{i,j} are not considered at all in this construct and details of the
rationale why it is not considered are provided in section 3.2. The matrix z̄ can be viewed
as the adjacency matrix of a weighted digraph representing the network.
Finding a solution for the system in equation (1.7) is key to establishing the estima-
tion methodology of this chapter. The matrix U has only ones on its diagonal. Proving
its invertibility is the main goal in order to establish an estimation methodology that has
applicability to this problem. A sketch of this proof proceeds by identifying that U has a
special structure and exploiting this structure for the proof.

















A special case of U is the undirected complete network (with weighted or unweighted links),
so that every trader in the network is connected to every other trader, and each bilateral
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link in the network has symmetric weights. This way, trader i and trader j each have the
same weight on the link ij within the network. U becomes a symmetric matrix in that case.
Exploiting the special structure of the general case U , a simple but formal proof is given to
show that U can be inverted, except for one special case for which not an exact solution but
an arbitrarily close approximation to the inverse is found. The next proposition summarizes
the essence of being able to invert U and enables us to establish the estimation methodology
of this chapter.
PROPOSITION 1: For any trading network that can be characterized by the system
of equations (1.1) to (1.6), there exist equilibrium expectations about the value of the traded
asset for each trader, conditional on the trader’s private signal and the information diffusion
through the network
Proof: (See Appendix)
This establishes a computational procedure for resolving the equilibrium posterior beliefs of
traders’ conditional valuations of the traded asset using the Conditional Guessing Game,
which BK proves to converge to the traders’ equilibrium posterior beliefs of traders’ condi-
tional valuations of the traded asset in the OTC Game, E[θi|si,pgi ]. Having this resolved
enables us to calculate the equilibrium prices and quantities. To start, equations (1.1) to
(1.5) can be shown to yield the following interconnections among the trading intensities













Combined with the notion that the equilibrium in the Conditional Guessing Game coincides
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with that for the OTC Game, equilibrium prices in equation (1.4) become:
pij =





And the equilibrium trade quantities, qiij = t
i
ij(ei − pij), become:
qiij =














= qeij, say (1.11)
Estimating the posterior beliefs in equation (1.7) and combining them with equation
(1.10) and equation (1.11) yields the equilibrium prices and quantities in the OTC trading
network. Using transaction data on prices and the corresponding quantities, the endoge-
nously determined parameters, ziij, z
j
ij, and y
i, can be estimated, together with the dealers’
observation of the valutation signals si’s of the various dealers participating in trading an
asset. For a complete network of N traders, there are N(N − 1)/2 connections, and each
connection will have a z
{i,j}
ij pair, making a total of N(N − 1) z’s to estimate. There will
also be a total of N different yi’s and si’s to estimate, in addition to any other ancillary
parameters that are needed. An actual trading network in an OTC market will have some
degree of sparsity and consequently have fewer than the N +N2 parameters, plus ancillary
parameterization, to estimate. Even so, for a real-world network, N could easily be in the
range of 2000 to 5000 and produce the order of about 25,000,000 maximum parameters that
must be estimated. As we will see in Chapter 3, implementing this estimating procedure for
a real-world network requires the estimation of a few millions of parameters. An estimation
problem of that scale requires a method that is well-suited to handle the scale of parameter
count vis-a-vis the potential sparsity of the data for estimation. The next section describes
a tool that can be harnessed to achieve a suitable estimation procedure for the estimation
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problem that has been described in this section.
1.5 Inference: Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo and the No-U-Turn-Sampler
Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo (HMC), also known as Hybrid Monte-Carlo, is an algorithm by
which Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) can be implemented to use Hamiltonian dy-
namics (Newton’s laws of motion expressed as a system of differential equations) to evolve
the state of the model parameters through the parameter space. MCMC progresses by using
some mechanism to propose the next state in parameter space for the model parameters be-
ing simulated. Contrasting HMC with alternates like Random-wallk Metropolis, HMC has
the advantage of using the Hamiltonian dynamics to evolve the state of the system to a next
state that is much farther away from the current. The superiority of being able to harness
Hamiltonian dynamics to evolve the state of the system to farther locations in a single step is
more pronounced when the parameter space is high dimensional. In this section, I will first
provide a brief technical description of MCMC and subsequently describe how Hamiltonian
dynamics is used to implement MCMC in the HMC algorithm. I will close the section by
describing how HMC can be automatically tuned by use of the No-U-Turn-Sampler that the
Stan probabilistic programming language implements (see http://mc-stan.org).
1.5.1 Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC)
The Monte-Carlo method is a means by which the Expectation of a function, f , of a random
variable, X, can be calculated. Let X is a random vector, then its expectation can be
expressed as γ = E[f(X)] =
∑
j f(xj)P (X = xj). By the Law of Large Numbers, i.i.d.





. In practice, however, drawing i.i.d random vectors could
be challenging, especially if the components are not independent. Fortunately, instead of
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drawing i.i.d random variables, a Markov-Chain with a stationary distribution πj = P (X =
xj) could be used. For this to be possible however, the Markov-Chain must be (a) irreducible
(b) ergodic (c) time-reversible. This notion of performing Monte-Carlo using a Markov-Chain
underlies the MCMC method. In what follows, the Markov-Chain will be assumed to have
a countable set of states. Even though the Markov-Chains of interest in MCMC mostly
have uncountable states, the countability assumption helps with exposition without lose to
the general concepts. A Markov-Chain is said to be irreducible if it has only one class of
states, that is if all states are transient or recurrent. If τii = min{n ≥ 1 : Xn = i|X0 = i}
is the number of steps it takes the Markov-Chain process to return to state i after starting
in that state, and we define τii =∞ to mean the process never returns to state i; then, the
process is said to be recurrent if P(τii < ∞) = 1 and transient if P(τii < ∞) < 1. In the
former, i.e. when the process is recurrent, if the expected value E[τii] < ∞ the process is
said to be positive recurrent ; it is said to be null recurrent if E[τii] = ∞. If the Markov
Chain is positive recurrent, the stationary distribution πj = P (X = xj) can be shown to
be given by πj = 1/E[τii], and thereby lends an intuitive interpretation to the stationary
distribution πj as the fraction of time the process spends in state j. This exposition leads
into the explanation for the second condition: ergodicity. A Markov-Chain is said to be
ergodic if all its states are ergodic. For a state of a Markov-Chain to be ergodic, it has to
be both positive recurrent and aperiodic. Positive recurrence means that any state of the
Markov-Chain is recurrent and the Markov-Chain itself has a finite number of states and its
stationary distribution, πj = 1/E[τii] is well defined. Furthermore, an irreducible Markov-
Chain has a solution to the following system of equations, called the balance equations, if









The solution, if it exists, is unique (Ross (2010, p. 216)); which means that the solution for
the balance equations of a positive recurrent Markov-Chain exists and is unique. The fore-
gone also means that the ”quantity of probability” will not flow out of a positive recurrent
Markov-Chain and get exhausted. This notion shall eventually be referred to as the ”con-
servation of probability” in analogy to the ”conservation of energy” in a Newtonian physical
system. This set of requirements when applied to condition (a) essentially reduces that con-
dition (the irreducibility condition) to one of positive recurrence. Aperiodic means that the
state of the Markov-Chain does not exhibit periodicity, or has periodicity of zero. Intuitively,
it represents the number of periods before a state can be re-entered, hence being aperiodic
means a state can be reentered without any number of periods lapsing or having to satisfy
any cyclicality requirement. If a Markov-Chain is aperiodic, then the limiting probability
that the chain is in state j is the stationary distribution, i.e. the claim πj = P (X = xj)
becomes justifiable. A Markov-Chain is said to be time-reversible if, when reversed, the
reverse process has the same transition probabilities as the forward process. Let Pij be the
forward process, that is, the transition from state i at time t of the process X to state j at







This implies that πiPij = πjPji, and gives the condition for time-reversibility of a Markov-
chain. P (X = k) = πk is the stationary distribution of the process and Pji is the backward
transition in this context, implying that the time-reversibility condition is well-defined when
the stationary distribution is well-defined. If {k ∈ Ai} is the set of states into which the pro-
cess can transition from state i, then satisfying time-reversibility can be interpreted as the
”quantity of probability” flowing into state i equals the ”quantity of probability” flowing out
of state i when probability is thought of to be some bulk matter for illustration. A Markov-
chain that satisfies this condition is also said to satisfy the detailed balance condition, see
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Ross (2010, p. 249 - 265) for further details.
The use of MCMC in Bayesian computations to find the posterior distribution P (θ|x)
of a set of model parameters θ being learned from a dataset x is common. There are several
variations of how MCMC is implemented in practice, but they all involve making a proposal
θ∗ at time t for the next state in the learning process to find P (θ|x), and using some rule
(the acceptance criteria) to compare this proposal to the current state of the process, θt−1, to
determine whether to accept or reject the proposal θ∗. If accepted, θ∗ becomes θt, otherwise
θt−1 becomes θt. The algorithm for making a proposal and deciding whether or not accept
it invariably differentiates the various forms of MCMC that currently exist in practice. The
Gibbs Sampling method, the Metropolis method, and the Metropolis-Hastings method are
all examples of MCMC algorithms that are used in practice (see Gelman et. al. (2014, p.
275 - 281)). HMC’s superiority is in its ability to make proposals, θ∗, that are very far from
θt−1 compared to what can be achieved with the other methods, and additionally having
relatively much higher acceptance rates for proposals it makes.
1.5.2 Hamiltonian Dynamics and HMC
In a high-dimensional parameter space, inefficiencies with moving through the parameter
distribution confounds the performance of the Gibbs and Metropolis algorithms, because
these algorithms exhibit random-walk behavior and thus progress too slowly through the pa-
rameter space. HMC, on the otherhand, uses Hamiltonian dynamics to move more rapidly
through the parameter distribution even in high-dimensional parameter distributions. Hami-
tonian dynamics governing motion in a d-dimensional space (that is, a representation of a
parameter vector of dimension d) has a d-dimensional position vector q and a d-dimensional
momentum vector p, and the Hamiltonian is the function H(q, p) which describes the total
17












The Hamiltonian is defined to comprise of potential energy U(q) and kinetic energy K(p), so
that H(q, p) = U(q)+K(p) (for further details, see Handbook of Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo
(2011, p. 113 - 160)). In HMC, U(q) = − logP (θ|x) and K(p) = pTM−1p/2, where M is the
mass matrix, which must be positive-definite and symmetric because it is also used as the
covariance matrix to sample the momentum variable as a normally-distributed variate. In
most applications, M is chosen to be a diagonal matrix, but in some advanced applications,
especially when there is the need for HMC to navigate a parameter manifold with sharply
changing curvature, M is made adaptive to the curvature of manifold by defining it to be of
a form motivated by the Fisher-Rao information matrix, see Betancourt (2013). To evolve
the Hamiltonian, a numerical integration scheme, referred to as the leapfrog integrator, is
employed.
Implementing Hamiltonian dynamics for use in HMC, the target (posterior) distribu-
tion, P (θ|x) (for simplicity, we willl say P (θ) henceforth) which is a distribution on the
parameter-set θ is augmented with an auxilliary parameter set φ of the same length. In
this construct, θ represents the position vector q, and φ represents the momentum vector p.
Consequently, we now have the joint distribution P (θ, φ), which is factorized as follows:
P (θ, φ) = P (φ|θ)P (θ)
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And equate the terms as follows:
−H(q, p) = logP (φ|θ) + logP (θ) = −K(p)− U(q)
Often, as seen in Gelman et. al. (2014, p. 300 - 308), P (φ|θ) is chosen to be independent, so
that P (φ|θ) = P (φ). This form makes exposition simpler without loss of generality in what
follows. To update φ, that is the momentum variable p, the following relation from equation











To update θ, i.e. the position variable q, the following relation from equation (1.12) holds










This scheme for updating φ and θ is implemented by numerical integration, termed leapfrog





First, an integration stepsize ε and a total number of leapfrog steps per evolution L must be
chosen. Once the two constants ε and L are fixed, the following set of steps are undertaken:
(i) make a draw of φ ∼ N(0,M)




(iii) using equation (1.15), make a full update for the position variable: θ = θ + εM−1φ
(iv) using equation (1.14), make a full update for the momentum variable: φ = φ+ εd logP (θ)
dθ
(v) using equation (1.15), make a full update for the position variable: θ = θ + εM−1φ
(vi) repeat (iv) and (v) for (L− 2) times





Choosing ε and L appropriately has implications for how efficiently HMC will run, and doing
that belongs in the realm of tuning the HMC algorithm.
1.5.3 Tuning HMC Using No-U-Turn-Sampling (NUTS)
Tuning the HMC algorithm means choosing L and ε to achieve optimal performance. Choos-
ing an L that is too large causes the leapfrog integration process to take too many unneeded
steps and waste computation resources. Choosing L to be too small causes the algorithm
to not travel far enough in the parameter space when it completes the set of sequences in
the leapfrog integration cycle and would therefore cause the algorithm to exhibit undesired
random-walk behavior. When ε is too large, the energy conservation property of the Hamil-
tonian is lost (and by interpretation, the conservation of the log-probability, or satisfying
the detailed-balance condition (time-reversibility) is violated) during evolution of the HMC,
resulting in high rejection rates for proposals. Conversely, if ε is too small, efficient explo-
ration of the parameter space is lost, as the leapfrog integration updates move too slowly.
Gelman and Hoffman (2014) present No-U-Turn-Sampling (NUTS), an algorithm that can
be used to automatically tune L and ε to achieve efficient performance that performs at least
as well as an optimally hand-tuned HMC.
Hand-tuning L typically requires two separate passes of fully running the HMC al-
gorithm, whereas using NUTS, L can be tuned adaptively. The method involves so-called
repeated doubling, in which a binary tree is built and at each stage of the tree perform-
ing 2i leapfrog steps in a forward or backward direction in the space of the Hamiltonian’s
evolution time, where i is the height of the tree and the direction is chosen from a uni-
form distribution (see Gelman and Hoffman (2014) for further details). While building the
binary tree and increasing the number of leapfrog steps, a criterion is applied to ensure
that the proposals for the position, θ∗, being generated continue to increase the distance
away from the last position, θ. Satisfying this criterion means that continuing to evolve
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the current iteration (that is, continuing to increase L for the current iteration) will con-
tinue to increase the distance |θ∗ − θ|. Analytically, this is equivalent to the derivative of





= (θ∗ − θ) d
dt
(θ∗ − θ) = (θ∗ − θ) · φ must be greater or equal to 0).
This criterion essentially says that the momentum vector, φ, must lead in the direction of
increasing (θ∗−θ), and θ∗ must not make a U-turn. This procedure alone does not guarantee
time-reversibility, the condition (c) in section 1.5.1 – a detailed-balance condition. Hence,
the repeated doubling procedure of building a binary tree whose leaves are then used to
determine θ∗ is meant to remedy the potential violation of the time-reversibility condition.
With repeated doubling introduced, let θ+ be the position variable on the leaf nodes to the
right (forward simulation time) and θ− be the position variable on the leaf nodes to the left
(backward simulation time). Also, let p+ and p− be the respective momentum variables asso-
ciated with these leaf nodes. Then the ”U-turn” criterion now becomes (θ+− θ−) ·φ− < 0 or
(θ+− θ−) ·φ+ < 0. Another stopping criterion for repeated doubling is if the log-probability
in a given state becomes too small, in which case the stopping of repeated doubling is fail-
ure. This second criterion represents a failure to preserve the detailed-balance condition,
the same reason for which an excessively large ε would cause failure. In the Stan software’s
implementation of NUTS, this state is referred to as causing a divergent transition to occur.
To tune the stepsize, ε, Gelman and Hoffman (2014) use stochastic optimization with
vanishing adaption from Andrieu and Thoms (2008), and with dual-averaging from Nesterov
(2009). The adaptation parameter in stochastic optimization (the so-called learning rate
in Machine Learning) must meet the conditions
∑




t < ∞, and typical
settings being ηt = t
−κ where κ ∈ (0.5, 1] meet this condition. In stochastic optimization, the
update rule for a decision variable x and stochastic gradient H is xt+1 = xt−ηtHt. Applying
dual-averaging, this rule is extended to x̄t+1 = ηtxt+1 + (1− ηt)x̄t. The objective criterion in
the optimization to tune ε is the proposal acceptance rate of the HMC algorithm. However,
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when NUTS has been implemented to tune the HMC algorithm, there is no longer a single
acceptance step, and an averaging of the HMC acceptance rule across all leaf nodes at the
current stage of the evolution of the tree built by the repeated doubling process is used. The






. After this quantity has
been averaged across all the leaf nodes to obtain α, say, and the target acceptance rate is δ,
the following subsequent steps are taken to update the setting for ε:
(i) H̄t = (1− ηt)H̄t−1 + ηt(δ − α)
(ii) log εt = f(H̄t)
(iii) log ε̄t = g(log εt)
The functions f(·) and g(·) are linear functions. Steps (i) to (iii) are repeated throughout
the adaptation period of the run, and the final value of ε̄t at the end of the adaption period
is held constant for the rest of the run.
1.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have seen how the endogenous parameters of a model of strategic trading
in an inter-dealer OTC trading network can be estimated. I have provided a mathematical
proof that this method is feasible in the general sense. I have also proposed and described a
Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo method that would be most suitable for performing inference for
this parameter estimation problem, considering that the number of parameters to estimate
could be in the millions.
Typically, where millions of samples of a Gibbs or Metropolis MCMC procedure would
be needed in order to obtain practically useful solutions, 1000 samples from an HMC-NUTS
procedure performs as well or even better (see comparisions in Gelman and Hoffman (2014)).
Consequently, this chapter provides a guide for a practically feasible empirical investigation
of the BK model considered here.
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Chapter 2
Empirical Augmentations, Multiple Assets, and a Hier-
archical Probability Model for Estimation
2.1 Introduction
Researchers in market microstructure have studied various mechanisms by which information
asymmetries arise in financial markets. Some of these mechanisms, such as the distribution of
initial risk endowments and risk allocations and preferences driving information asymmetries,
transcend market structures and have been identified to exist in both centralized and decen-
tralized markets. Others, such as private information driving endogenously formed strategic
information diffusion, have been identified primarily for OTC markets. Consequently, it is
prudent to anticipate that a mix of driving mechanisms would cause information asymme-
tries when studying the OTC market microstructure. Thus, the question arises about how to
separate the other effects from the private information effects, particularly when conducting
an empirical study on the presence of private information-driven asymmetries as a driver
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of strategic behavior in OTC trading networks. It is worth noting that the other mecha-
nisms driving information asymmetry may have agents that are not necessarily risk-neutral,
whereas the private information mechanism in Chapter 1 is developed for risk-neutral agents.
Also, whereas the theoretical OTC trading model presented in Chapter 1 is formulated
to apply to a single divisible traded asset, transaction data used in empirical applications
typically contain several different traded bonds. Showing how the single-asset-model frame-
work can be applied to several different traded bonds is not trivial, because it is unlikely that
the same fixed set of dealers would participate in trading the different bonds in the sample.
This situation leads to questions about how the model parameters of the trading network
may, or may not, be varied when applied across multiple traded assets that are different,
and are traded by different sets of dealers in the trading network. These questions are also
addressed in this chapter.
In this chapter, we review other mechanisms that have also been studied to give rise to
information asymmetries in OTC markets, and formulate an augmentation to the estimation
relations derived in Chapter 1 to provide an empirical separation of the other mechanisms
of information asymmetry from private information driven asymmetries. Also, we describe a
procedure for repeated use of the same interdealer trading network to trade different bonds,
even though different subnetworks might trade the different bonds represented in a given
transaction data sample. Finally, we present a formulation of the resulting, augmented
estimation relations as a Bayesian estimation problem. The next section reviews the related
literature; the section after that derives the augmented estimation methodology; the section
that follows thereafter presents how a repeated use of the trading network to trade different
bonds by potentially different subset of dealers is represented in the estimation; the next
section after that derives the hierarchical probability model that must be applied to the
estimation problem for Bayesian inference; and, the final section concludes.
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2.2 Related Literature
In a previous study that modeled imperfect competition by price impact of traders, Mala-
mud and Rostek (2017) generalize price impact for market structures, from centralized to
decentralized exchanges. They characterize the conditions of exogenously determined risk en-
dowment distributions and risk-aversion of traders under which welfare gains may result from
decentralizing financial markets. Giannikos (2012) characterizes an endogenous distribution
of information asymmetry within an economy with exogenously determined distributions of
trader risk-aversions. Wang (1994) derives a model in which individual risk endowments and
aggregate risks are reflected in prices, and the degree of heterogeneity among investor rational
expectations is reflected in the joint distribution of traded prices and quantities. Subsequent
to Wang (1994), Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998), Li and Schuroff (2019), Bessembinder
(2006), and Hollifield et. al (2017) have all used trading volumes to proxy information con-
tent of price changes in their studies.
Regarding the specifics of how OTC networks are used for trading, Babus and Hu
(2017), Glode and Opp (2016), Hollifield et al (2017) have all described interdealer trading
networks being used as intermediation chains. One common feature in these studies is that
the same interdealer network that is in place is harnessed in repeated use to intermediate
different bonds. This feature apparently rests on the notion that the links in the interdealer
trading network represent well established, long-lived, trading relationships, as expressed by
Wang (2016), Babus (2012), Neklyudov (2017), Li and Schurhoff (2019).
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2.3 The Augmented Estimation Methodology: Exogenous De-
mand and Trading Behavior in the OTC Network
This subsection formulates the empirical augmentation of the BK model to obtain a final
model specification that is used for estimation. The strategic trading described so far derives
endogenous information asymmetries by a private information mechanism for risk-neutral
agents. Correlations across common and private information of dealers about asset valua-
tions give rise to the structure of information asymmetries within that model. Plausibly,
other mechanisms may also be at play to drive the transaction flow; for example, Malamud
and Rostek (2017) describe heterogeneities in risk-preferences and initial risk-endowment
distributions to give rise to price impact within general market structures. The private in-
formation mechanism driving the formation of endogenous information asymmetries appears
natural to trading networks, because it models the trading network directly in its formula-
tion of demand functions and thereby lends itself to easy analysis in actual OTC networks.
Consequently, harnessing the properties of the trading network to split private information
driven effects from non-private information effects is feasible. Formulation of the empirical
augmentation that follows is meant to capture any other plausible mechanisms that may
affect the determination of transaction prices.
The consequence of an agent being risk-neutral versus not being risk-neutral primarily
arises in how each optimizes wealth under conditions of uncertainty. Relationships that result
from decisions to optimize wealth under any uncertainty conditions have already been trans-
formed through the utility functions reflecting the agents’ risk preferences. Consequently,
ex-poste the wealth optimization decisions, resulting expressions may be contrasted to some
extent without further recourse to the respective utility functions through which they were
transformed to arive at the expressions in question. Harnessing this idea, I make a compari-
son between how a risk-neutral agent responds to exogenously determined demand and how
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a risk-averse agent responds to exogenously determined levels of risk aversion.
It is worth noting in equations (1.9) and (1.11) the presence of the exogenous param-
eter, βij, and how it might impact the endogenously determined trading intensities, tij, and
quantities, qiij – expressions that result after risk-neutral wealth optimization. In Giannikos
(2012), we see a connection between the exogenously determined risk-aversion parameter,
α, and the endogenously determined quantitites traded in the expressions that result after
risk-averse wealth optimizations. The impacts of both βij and α are reflective of how such
exogenously determined phenomena could proxy information flows and asymmetries.
To see the connections between trading intensities for risk-netural agents, and traders’
risk behavior for risk-averse agents, consider as an example the model setting of Giannikos
(2012). Contrasting BK with Giannikos (2012) exposes the parallels between trading inten-
sities in this study and risk behavior as shown in the Giannikos (2012) context, even though
Giannikos (2012) relates to centralized trading and BK relates to decentralized (OTC) trad-
ing. Demand functions in Giannikos (2012) take the general form q = E[u|·]−rP
αVar[u|·] , and resolving
E[u|·] and Var[u|·] is determined by information structure representations in the dichotomous
distinctions it draws between Informed versus Uninformed traders. However, in the OTC
trading model described in Chapter 1, dealers in the trading network are all ”existentially”
informed, and what distinguishes one dealer from the other is the degree to which they’re
informed. The degree to which a dealer is informed is itself dependent on the extent and
quality of the connectedness of a dealer within the network. Consequently, being informed
is a continous measure in BK. In contrast with Giannikos (2012) being informed assumes
one of two discreet states: either the dealer is informed or he is not. The Giannikos (2012)




q, where p and q are respectively
price and quantities. Comparing it with the demand function in equation (1.5), which is of





, we see that α ≡ 1
tiij
, which implies that lower Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion, CARA (α), for a risk-averse agent is analogous to higher trading intensities
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for a risk-neutral agent who then creates larger price impacts. In Malamud and Rostek
(2017), this statement is made more explicitly, to the effect that relatively less risk-averse
agents have a relatively larger price impact as they face a relatively more inelastic supply
curve. This rough analogy, with E[u|·]
r
and E[θi|·] both uncertain intercept terms that must
be resolved in order to fix the residual demand schedule, essentially aligns the intuition and
the analytical constructs about a trader’s level of risk aversion for the risk-averse trader and
trading intensities for a risk-netural trader (of course, not mentioning the market structure
and mechanisms by which equilibrium is attained).
In the foregone, the exogneous parameters drive endogenously determined demand,
and subsequently also information asymmetries. In the case of Giannikos (2012), exogenous
risk-aversions drive asymmetries manifested by the endogenous proportions of Informed and
Uninformed agents. In the case of BK, exogenous OTC customer demand impacts trad-
ing intensities which are coupled to the endogenously determined information asymmetry
weights z
{i,j}
ij ’s presented in Chapter 1. They both depict implications for trade volumes, in-
formation flows, and asymmetries. In the price discovery literature, studies covering various
financial product types and market structures have been conducted to bear out the fact that
trade volumes correlate with information flows and asymmetries, intertemporally or contem-
poraneously or both, to bring about permanent price impact. Wang (1994) formulates a
model of perfect competion in which the degree of heterogeneity among investors in their
investment needs manifests in the extent of trade volumes seen in the market. The Wang
(1994) model is built upon the premise of prices reflecting aggregate, as well as individual,
risks of agents in incomplete markets where heterogeneity in investors’ rational expectations
consequently arise. In that setting, the joint behavior of traded quantities and equilibrium
prices reflect information about the nature of the heterogeneity that exists among the agents
in the market. This notion of traded quantities reflecting information about price formation
transcends market structures and the types of traded assets. Li and Schuroff (2019) follow
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Bessembinder et. al. (2006) and Hollifield et. al. (2017) to use trade volumes to proxy the
information content of price change in OTC markets, respectively for Municipal Bonds and
Securitized Products, whereas the Wang (1994) model has the Stock market as its reference.
Kocagil and Shachmurove (1998) study this dynamic empirically for the Futures market in
various commodities.
The impact of exogenous client demand on trading intensity and trade volumes is re-
flected by the parameter β from equations (1.9) and (1.11), so that for an existing trading
link ij in the OTC trading network, increased exogenous client activity is expected to be
reflected in an increase in the magnitude of β. However, such an increase must not be per-
manent since βij is assumed to be fixed for a given bilateral trading link ij. The following
hypothesis summarizes this notion of β having a transient component.
HYPOTHESIS 2.1: The quantities traded on any bilateral trading link in the trading
network reflect a decomposition of exogenous customer demand into a component that is
static and permanent to the trading network and reflected by the private-information equi-
librium, and a component that is induced by information flow, is transient, and not reflected
by the private-information equilibrium. Hence, β admits a decomposition into a static com-
ponent that is constant for a given bilateral trading link, and an information-flow induced
transaction-specific effect that fluctuates from one transaction to the next
Motivated by the statement of Hypothesis 2.1, equations (1.10) and (1.11) (the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) price and quantity equations in BK) are modified respectively as























ij is a trade-specific effect on the price for security a traded on the trading link ij;
and, intp(a) is a security-specific effect on the price for security a; and, β
(a)
ij is a trade-specific
effect on the exogenous demand for security a traded on the trading link ij. In equation
(2.2), the definition of qe
(a)
ij is modified from what it is in equation (1.11) to reflect the notion






















2.4 Repeated Trading in the Interdealer Network
In this subsection, I describe how trading in various securities is analyzed using an OTC
trading network that is already in place. This amounts to a repeated use of the in-place
trading network, and although reflective of intermediation chains (Babus and Hu (2017),
Glode and Opp (2016), Hollifield et al (2017)) it does not dwell on intermediation chains to
function but rather may exhibit intermediation chains in use in some of its manifestations
– for example, if the data shows a security ID being traded from trader A to B, B to C, C
to D and so on, that would be an intermediation chain in effect. A fundamental premise of
the rest of the proceedings is that the links in the network represent well established trading
relationships (Wang (2016), Babus (2012), Neklyudov (2017), Li and Schurhoff (2019)). As
such, the network must have a stable assignment of weights to the private information effects
on each bilateral trading link so that the yi’s and z
{i,j}
ij ’s from equation (1.7) are fixed when
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trading occurs within the network for different securities. In this manner, trading for different
securities can be viewed as a repeated use of the existing network.
To set up the estimation problem, a system matrix to hold the z
{i,j}
ij ’s is constructed as
in equation (1.7), and its entries are defined for ziij to hold the parameter for the buyer on
the bilateral link ij and be entered in the cell ij of the system matrix, and zjij to hold same
for the seller and be entered in the cell ji of the system matrix. In doing so, an inherent
assumption has been made that for a security, A, that is traded between dealer i and dealer
j, the probability that dealer i will immediately turn around and sell A back to dealer j after
buying it from j is almost surely zero, which then implies that z
{i,j}
ji can not occur in this
construct. This notion was first expressed in section (1.4) and used to describe the entries
of the matrix z̄ in equation (1.7).
To guarantee that this construct works feasibly, the definition of a unique security in
this study incorporates the notion of a time window, the width of which has close association
with feasible trade execution speeds. Li and Schurhoff (2019), define prearranged trades in
the Municipal Bond market to be ones in which the buy and sell legs offset each other within
the same day. As such, I choose a time window of one day to represent the time period
during which the security’s price is reasonably expected to remain unchanged and to also
satisfy the requirement that z
{i,j}
ji can not occur when z
{i,j}
ij has occurred. Which means,
trader i will not immediately turn around and sell back to trader j the security she just
bought from trader j. To construct the data-set for an empirical study, the CUSIP identifier
of each security that is traded should have the trade date appended to the CUSIP to create
an identifier called the CUSIP-time identifier to represent a unique security in the sample.
For each CUSIP-time identifier, a subnetwork, represented by the graph (N ′, g′), must
be created so that nodes N ′ represent the traders within the larger network who traded
this particular CUSIP-time ID. As such, (N ′, g′) ⊆ (N, g), where (N ′, g′) and (N, g) are
respectively the graphs of the subnetwork and the complete network. The network matrices
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described on the right-hand side of equation (1.7) can then be constructed by reading in
the ȳi’s and zij
{i,j}’s from the larger network matrices, and for only the trading links in g′.
The sub-matrices constructed in this manner from the larger network matrices can then be
used to solve equation (1.7) to obtain the equilibrium beliefs of the Conditional Guessing
Game of section (1.3) for the various traders within (N ′, g′) to price the security having
this CUSIP-time ID. Constructing (N ′, g′) from (N, g) in this manner constitutes the main
methodological innovation of this subsection. It makes the process of obtaining estimates
for the endogenous network parameters computationally feasible. To illustrate, consider two
securities with respective CUSIP-time IDs, A and B, that traded in the network. Then for
the bilateral trading links on which these two securities traded, we have the following price
relationships:
pAij =




+ ∆pAij + intp
A
for all (i, j) ∈ g′A, where (N ′A, g′A) ⊆ (N, g) is the subnetwork, of the full network (N, g),
comprising traders that traded the CUSIP-time A. Similarly,
pBij =




+ ∆pBij + intp
B
for all (i, j) ∈ g′B, where (N ′B, g′B) ⊆ (N, g) is the subnetwork, of the full network (N, g),
comprising traders that traded the CUSIP-time B. Solving for eA{i,j} will use matrices z̄
and ȳ, and vector
⇀
sA constructed solely from the relevant z’s, y’s, and s’s corresponding to
traders who are indexed by the trading links appearing in the subnetwork g′A; likewise for
eB{i,j}. This leads to the following precise notion about the parameters of the network. Let







represent the subset of agents and their trading links that were involved in trading both
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Security A and Security B. If (NQ, gQ) = (N, g)
∣∣∣∣
SecurityQ
, then part of our main assumption
for repeated use of the network to trade potentially different assets will mean that (NA, gA)
and (NB, gB) have identical parameters. An implementation of this concept, including a
description of how the index sets are constructed, will be considered in Chapter 3, where an
empirical study that employs this concept is undertaken. The main idea is also summarized
in the hypothesis that follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2.2: If (N ′, g′) is a subnetwork of a larger trading network, (N, g), so
that (N ′, g′) ⊆ (N, g), then information diffusion in (N ′, g′) for price discovery is driven
by the same endogenous parameters of the larger network (N, g) from which the subnetwork
(N ′, g′) is constructed
To argue against the methodological approach described here, one could assert that a
trader’s weight on her own signal, the yi’s, would depend on the importance she places on
her own signal relative to those of the others she is connected to in the network. Further,
such importance might be determined by the relative sophistication of her own valuation
methods compared to those of the others. Consequently, such importance could be different
for one type of security versus another. Say, a security backed by one type of “story” versus
another. In fact, in Li and Schuroff (2019) a test of whether OTC network trading in Munic-
ipal Bonds that have State-level peculiarities differ from those not having such peculiarities.
Importance weights that change from pricing one security type to another is clearly an ar-
gument against holding the importance weights constant within the network throughout the
duration spanned by a data sample, which is what the methodological innovation described
in this section does. A similar argument could be made for the z
{i,j}
ij ’s. The methodological
innovation shown in this section would still be relevant if the antagonistic viewpoint still held
true to any degree, because the methodology described in this subsection can also be viewed
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to reflect an averaging over the range of the relevant importance weights. If Bayesian esti-
mation is used, then the dispersion over the relevant range of values would still be captured
and the uncertainty therein quantified. Furthermore, to feasibly provision for estimating
potentially differing trader-related importance weights within the network, the data sample
must have a sufficient number of occurences of repeated trading by the same trader(s) trad-
ing the same type of securities for the same time windows (that is, the ”time” portion of
CUSIP-time remains constant, whereas the CUSIP portion may change but still represent
identical security features for a given security under consideration). In such a setting, one
could envision a problem formulation reflective of the Bayesian regime switching model of
Agbeyegbe and Goldman (2005), and estimate different regimes of the model parameters
to represent the differing competencies a trader would have in trading securities backed by
different stories.
2.5 Bayesian Estimation of Model Parameters
In this subsection, Bayesian estimation equations are developed using equations (2.1) and
(2.2) as the central concepts. Harnessing the notion of re-using the same pre-existing trading
network to conduct repeated trading in multiple securities, the estimation problem is set up
and described.
2.5.1 A Hierarchical Probability Model
Recalling the definitions of the variables in section (1.3), in order to fit a given traded CUSIP-
time ID, A, traded by trader r in the OTC network, we have that s
(A)
r = Θ(A) +ηr+εr, where
ηr ∼ N(0, σ2η), εr ∼ N(0, σ2ε ), and Θ(A) ∼ N(Θ(A), σ2Θ); where Θ(A) is the common valuation
of asset A across the various dealers that traded it, also referred to as A’s common value.
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As such, ηr and εr are trader-specific uncertainty terms, whereas (Θ
(A) −Θ(A)) are security-
specific uncertainty terms, with the additional constrain that σ2Θ = ρσ
2, σ2η = (1− ρ)σ2, and
σ2ε = ζσ
2; where 0 < ρ < 1 and ζ > 0, so that ρ represents the square of the correlation
among dealer valuations of the asset. The dealer-specific uncertainty terms are assumed to
be identical and independent across all traders within a network. Whereas the (BK) model in
section (1.3) takes Θ(A) to be zero, I consider it to be unknown and learn it during inference
through a hierarchical formalution, without loss of generality. Θ(A) is defined here to have
a normal distribution, so that Θ(A) ∼ N(th1, th2), with th1 and th2 defined to have non-
informative hyper-priors (see Gelman (2013, p. 51 - 56) for background on non-informative
priors). Putting prior and hyperprior distributions on the parameters effectively controls
the frequency properties of the parameters in estimation and thus provides regularization
to deal with data sparsity. The hierarchical formulation also factilitates information sharing
across how values for the various Θ(A)’s will eventually turn out.
Furthermore, instead of using a Gibbs sampler, which converges too slowly, especially
in parameter spaces difficult to navigate by a Markov Chain due to correlatedness of the
parameters, an HMC-NUTS sampler is used, which in most cases can produce good results
with relatively few samples necessary to achieve mixing of the MCMC chains, even in a
parameter hyperplane with dimensions in the several thousands or even millions (see section
(1.5)). HMC works well for all but geometric manifolds with sharply changing curvatures
(Betancourt (2015)). An implementation of HMC-NUTS, described in section (1.5), can be
used to estimate the parameters in this specification of the model (see Gelman and Hoffman
(2014)). A software implementation of HMC-NUTS is available via the Stan probabilistic
Programming Language (see http://mc-stan.org). Interfaces to Stan are available through
R, Python, or the Linux command line (the CMDSTAN interface). Besides helping deal with
under-constrained estimation problems, the Stan implementation also helps handle interval
range constrains placed on the estimation parameters by the theory of the model, as well
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as circumventing algebraic ill-conditioning of the estimation problem because a posterior
distribution is learned by exploration using MCMC and thus does away with having to
solve algebraic systems to optimize an objective function for the estimation. The constrain
z
{i,j}
ij ∈ (0, 2) must be satisfied in order for the solution in equation (1.3) to be a maxi-
mum, that is, satisfying the second-order condition there. Also, yi’s must be constrained
to be positive, since traders are expected to have a positive correlation between their own
expectations and the signal they receive about the asset’s valuation. Consequently, the joint
posterior distribution for the parameters, conditional on trade data, is derived as follows,
invoking the expressions in equations (2.1) and (2.2):
Let a index securities, and i and j index nodes connected by links ij in a trading network














































yi ∼ Gamma(a(1), a(2))
ziij ∼ TN(0,2)(1, 1)




ij ∼ Gamma(α1, α2)
σ ∼ Gamma(sd(1), sd(2))
ζ ∼ Gamma(sth1, sth2)
Θ(a) ∼ N(th1, th2)
ρ ∼ N(0.5, 1)
∆p
(a)
ij ∼ N(µ, λ))
intp(a) ∼ N(intpm, intps))
















(a), diag((1 + ζ)σ2)
)
Although, Θ(a), ηr, and εr are each sampled separately during estimation.
TN(a,b)(m,n) is the Truncated Normal distribution with mean m and variance n, constrained
to have non-zero density only in the interval (a, b). The parameters that follow are the (level
1) hyper-parameters in this hierarchical formulation (Gelman (2006)) of the estimation prob-
lem, together with their prescribed prior distributions:
ψ(a) ∼ Gamma(w1, w2)
Γ(a) ∼ Gamma(τ1, τ2)
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V ∼ Gamma(d1, d2)
γ ∼ Gamma(e1, e2)
α1 ∼ Gamma(f1, f2)
α2 ∼ Gamma(h1, h2)
µ ∼ N(l1, l2)
λ ∼ Gamma(m1,m2)
intpm ∼ N(op1, op2)
intps ∼ Gamma(om1, om2)
The following are (level 2) hyper-parameters in this hierarchical model, and as I am not in-
terested in learning these parameters, I give them all the same Gamma(1, 1) non-informative
prior distribution:
a(1), a(2), sd(1), sd(2), sth1, sth2, th2, d1, d2, e1, e2, f1, f2, h1, h2, l2,m1,m2, op2, om1, om2,
w1, w2, τ1, τ2. With th1, l1, op1 ∼ N(0, 2)
Assuming a = 1 to A are unique CUSIP-time IDs that traded in the OTC network and
(N (a), g(a)) corresponds to the subnetwork in which a given CUSIP-time ID a traded as de-
scribed in section (2.4). Then, it follows that (N (a), g(a)) ⊆ ∪Kr=1(Nr, gr). Where (Nr, gr) is
the trading network of dealer r who participated in trading the CUSIP-time ID a, and there
are K such dealers. In what follows, G(·, ·) is a short form of the Gamma(·, ·) distribution.
Applying Baye’s rule, we have the following posterior joint distribution of the network pa-

































































ij|1, 1) ∗ TN(0,2)(z
j
ij|1, 1) ∗G(βij|v, γ)
]
∗
G(v|d1, d2) ∗G(γ|e1, e2) ∗G(α1|f1, f2) ∗G(α2|h1, h2) ∗G(σ|sd(1), sd(2)) ∗G(ζ|sth1, sth2)∗
N(µ|l1, l2) ∗G(λ|m1,m2) ∗N(intpm|op1, op2) ∗G(intps|om1, om2) ∗G(w1|1, 1) ∗G(w2|1, 1)∗
G(τ1|1, 1) ∗G(τ2|1, 1) ∗G(d1|1, 1) ∗G(d2|1, 1) ∗G(e1|1, 1) ∗G(e2|1, 1) ∗N(th1|0, 2)∗
G(th2|1, 1) ∗G(sd(1)|1, 1) ∗G(sd(2)|1, 1) ∗N(ρ|0.5, 1) ∗G(sth1|1, 1) ∗G(sth2|1, 1) ∗G(a(1)|1, 1)∗
G(a(2)|1, 1) ∗G(f1|1, 1) ∗G(f2|1, 1) ∗G(h1|1, 1) ∗G(h2|1, 1)∗
N(l1|0, 2) ∗G(l2|1, 1) ∗G(m1|1, 1) ∗G(m2|1, 1) ∗N(op1|0, 2) ∗G(op2|1, 1)∗















j obtained by sampling




j from using the system






































j is not used directly
from the solution of the system in equations in (1.7) is because, in the proof that this system
is solvable it was also shown that the solution to a nearby problem could be returned (see





j , obtained from the solution of the system of equations in (1.7), and has a vanishing
variance of 0.052 allows the hierarchical probability model the additional flexibility to find the
best solution within the general neighborhood of the problem that maximizes the posterior
probability.
Prior distributions for intp(a), ∆p
(a)
ij , and β
(a)
ij are hierarchical, with all securities and
trades sharing the same prior, providing information-sharing effects across the entire data-




ij is meant to capture deviations of the
actual traded quantities from the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) levels, and it is tied
to the deviations of the traded price through the trade-specific exogenous demand factor
β
(a)
ij . In this formulation, the traded price is considered to comprise a component that arises
from equation (1.10) and a component that arises purely from liquidity considerations and is
consequently transient in nature, representing the deviations from the BNE price as shown
in equation (2.1). The second component of the price so determined is considered to be con-
nected to the transient component of β, and constitutes deviations from the BNE quantities
as shown from the relationship between equations (1.11) and (2.2).
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2.5.2 Prior and Hyper-prior Parameter Distributions
In this subsection, I discuss the prior and hyper-prior distributions defined for the vari-
ous parameters in the probability model specified in section (2.5.1). In what follows, all
non-informative Gamma priors will be the Gamma(1, 1) distributed. Hyper-parameters are
applied to a parameter in the model when it is useful in the context of the estimation to learn
the parameters of its distribution from inference, rather than fix them. Hyper-parameters are
also used as a mechanism to share information across the parameters of a hierarchical model
structure. Parameters sharing the same hyper-parameter distribution, together contribute
to how the hyper-parameter distribution is realized. By concurrently contributing to fixing
the hyperparameter distribution, they transmit (share) information to the other parameters
about the values they themselves want to assume, which then is information about the as-
pects of the data they affect. In such a case, the parameters of the distribution to be learned
become variables themselves in the estimation problem. For example, applying the same
parameter distribution to each instance yi of all i’s provides a richer information structure
for inference, as the parameters and hyper-parameters to be learned enable information-
sharing across all the yi’s about the values they each must assume. The parameter, yi, is
dealer i’s weight he places on his own prior valuation signal of the asset to be traded, so
it must be non-negative. And, yi’s hyper-parameters, defined as a(1) and a(2), are given
non-informative Gamma priors, because we are not particularly interested in learning about
the specific distributions of a(1) and a(2), so we keep them fixed. The parameters that follow
next are either standard deviations of a normal distribution, or multipliers of a standard
deviation. Consequently, each is given a gamma distribution with hyper-parameters, which
themselves are given non-informative Gamma priors: σ, with hyper-parameters sd(1) and
sd(2); ζ, with hyper-parameters sth1 and sth2; ψ
(a), with hyper-parameters w1 and w2; and,
Γ(a), with hyper-parameters τ1 and τ2. For βij, it is gamma-distributed with parameters, V
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and γ. It is of interest to learn the distributions of V and γ through inference, rather than
fix them, hence each has its own set of hyper-parameters; respectively d1, d2, and e1, e2,
and each of these hyper-parameters has a non-informative Gamma prior. Similarly for β
(a)
ij ,
which is also gamma-distributed, it is of interest to learn the distributions of its parameters
α1 and α2, so they each get their own set of hyper-parameters; respectively f1, f2, and h1,
h2, and each of which in turn gets a non-informative Gamma prior.
The next set of parameters to be discussed have normally distributed priors: the z
{i,j}
ij ’s
have normal distributions, truncated to have positive density only in the interval (0, 2),
and each has a mean of 1 and a nominal variance of 1. The mean of 1 is to center the
distribution at the middle of the interval in which it is defined. Dealer i forms a posterior
belief of the valuation of the asset to be traded through Bayesian learning when he interacts
with another trader, j, within his trading network, gi. And, z
i
ij is the precision weight
dealer i attaches to the price signal he gleans from dealer j over the network. Similarly, ρ is
normally distributed, truncated to lie in the interval (0,1), and centered at the middle of that
interval, at 0.5, and given a nominal variance of 1. The trade-specific fixed-effects, ∆p
(a)
ij , are
each given a normally distributed prior with hyper-parameter mean µ and variance λ shared
across each trading link, ij, and traded security, a. The mean of the distribution, µ, is also
normally distributed and has its own hyper-parameters l1 and l2 – its mean and variance
respectively – which themselves are given the respective distributions: a weakly informative
prior N(0, 22), and a non-informative prior Gamma(1, 1). The variance of the distribution,
λ, is Gamma distributed with its own hyper-parameters m1 and m2, which are each given
non-informative Gamma priors, Gamma(1, 1). The security-specific fixed-effects, intp(a),
are given a normally distributed prior with a hyper-parameter mean intpm and variance
intps shared across all traded securities, a. The mean intpm of the prior distribution is
also normally distributed and has its own hyper-parameters op1 and op2 – its mean and
variance respectively – which themselves are given the respective distributions: a weakly
42
informative N(0, 22) and a non-informative Gamma(1, 1). And, the standard deviation of
the distribution, intps, is Gamma distributed with its own hyper-parameters om1 and om2,
which are each given non-informative Gamma priors, Gamma(1, 1). Finally, Θ(a) is given a
normal distribution prior with a hyper-parameter mean, th1, which is normally distributed
with zero mean and a nominal variance of 1; and a hyper-parameter variance, th2, which is
given a non-informative Gamma prior, Gamma(1, 1).
2.6 Conclusion
This chaper offers novel hypotheses to derive a testable methodology for conducting empiri-
cal analyses to study private information-driven information asymmetries, which themselves
are connected with the imperative strategic behavior of dealers in an OTC trading network.
These hypotheses provide a premise on which the recipes that have been described for imple-
menting the estimation equations rest. This chapter also derives a hierarchical probability
model for the estimation equations to show how the parameters of the model can be es-
timated in an empirical inquiry. The probability model is in a form that can be readily
programmed using the Stan Probabilistic modeling language that implements HMC-NUTS
for use to conduct Bayesian inference. In anticipation of having to handle large data sam-
ples in an empirical inquiry that uses the approach outlined here, I recommend using Stan
through its command-line interface (CMDSTAN). Using CMDSTAN enables the use of a
Linux server for a more efficient handling of large data during estimation.
To motivate the main ideas driving the hypotheses, subsequent methodology, and em-
pirical procedure that were derived, first, an assessment of various mechanisms by which
information asymmetries arise in financial markets is conducted. Leading from insights
borne by this assessment, the estimation equations derived in Chapter 1 were augmented by
empirical components to suitably reflect these insights.
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Second, a review of trading networks as an outcome of long-lived trading relationships,
rather than randomly-formed connections, is conducted. This review leads to a methodology
by which the single divisible asset notion, to which the model of Chapter 1 applies, is extended
and made applicable to multiple assets. Finally, harnessing the structure of the estimation
problem resulting from the methodology for multiple assets, a hierarchical probability model
is formulated to take into account the mechanism prescribed for reuse of the same network
level parameters to analyze trading in potentially differing assets when they are traded by
same subset segment of the network. The outcome, thus, is an empirical procedure ready
to be applied to study the strategic behavior of dealers driven by information asymmetries
arising from private information in an OTC market. Such a study would provide an empirical
analysis of equilibrium in an OTC market.
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Analysis of Equilibrium in the Municipal
Bonds Market
3.1 Introduction
Researchers of OTC market microstructure have developed various equilibrium models to
characterize agents’ behavior in these markets. These models invariably identify indicative
factors that drive observed strategic behavior of the agents. Chapter 1 presented a theoretical
equilibrium model that describes dealers’ strategic behavior in an OTC trading network and
derived a methodology for directly estimating the endogenously determined parameters of
the model. Chapter 2 extended that model and also described an approach by which the
model can be implemented to conduct empirical analyses. This chapter conducts an empirical
study on the Municipal bond market, implementing the methodology developed in Chapter
1 and extended in Chapter 2, to directly estimate the endogenous parameters of the market.
The empirical study seeks to obtain precise characterizations of dealers’ strategic be-
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havior within the trading networks where they operate. Precisely, the study seeks to find
answers to questions such as the following: does the transaction data reflect the theoreti-
cal equilibrium? to what extent does private information drive observed transactions for the
OTC network being studied? does the theoretical model’s representation of dealers’ strategic
profit motives reflect in the transaction data? how does a dealer’s position within the network
influence her strategic behavior? The ability to directly estimate the endogenous parameters
of the trading network enables us to derive unique characterizations of how the indicative
factors of agents’ behavior within the model influence the attainment of equilibrium, and
how the equilibrium behavior itself looks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews literature
related to empirical studies on OTC markets microstructure; the section after that describes
the data sample used for the study and how it was processed to feed the estimation model;
after that, the next section presents the results obtained from the estimation; the section
that follows concludes the chapter.
3.2 Related Literature
Various researchers have conducted empirical studies of the OTC markets on trading fric-
tions. Research has primarily focused on trading costs in the following markets: Corpo-
rate bonds market (Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007); Bessembinder, Maxwell, and
Venkataraman (2006)), Municipal bonds market (Harris and Piwowar (2006); Li and Schurhoff
(2019)), and Structured/Securitized bonds market (Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017);
Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2013)). These researchers use models of the
market to motivate their empirical inquiries. The empirical research so far focuses on the
market structure and the strategic behavior of agents that drive the trading frictions. Harris
and Piwowar (2006), Edwards et. al. (2007), Bessembinder et. al. (2006) and Bessembinder
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et. al. (2013) all study trading costs in the context of market transparency. Transparency
is essentially a manifestation of the extent to which information about the valuation of the
traded securities is available or obtainable.
More recent studies – Li and Schurhoff (2019), and in Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt
(2017) – examine finer grained transparency characteristics such as the extent to which var-
ious dealers within a trading network are informed about the valuation of a traded security.
This concept of a dealer being informed recalibrates transparency from being a market-level
notion into a finer gradation of transparency – call it the degree of informedness – at the
level of the agent, which is akin to the former being a macro-concept whereas the later is a
micro-concept. Centrality of dealers’ position within a trading network has been found to
have special significance for trading costs in the markets that have been studied, because
central dealers are able to obtain, or more readily have available to them, greater trans-
parency about the valuations of bonds that are traded. Consequently, central dealers might
charge centrality discounts or premiums.
Recalibrating transparency to the micro (dealer) level provides further insights into
the price formation process in OTC markets. The theoretical model of Babus and Kon-
dor (2018) presents a framework that can be used to examine finer-grained behavior about
the price formation process, such as how central and/or peripheral dealers within a trading
network interact with the mechanisms that determine the imperfection competition equi-
librium allocations. A direct econometric estimation of their model, which hasn’t yet been
attempted to the best of my knowledge, has a potential to reveal deeper insights about




The data sample for this study is described in this section. The pre-processing that is
performed to organize the data into the form in which the estimation model uses it is also
described.
Table 3.1: Data Sample Description: Sub-table A is the Sample Universe; Sub-table B is
the subset with Par-traded >= $50k and Price > $1
Category # of Bonds # of Trades Mean Price Mean Size Total Volume
Sub-table A:
Total 539,225 9,458,109 $104.394 $218.578e+03 $2,067.33e+09
Corrected to ”D” 362,710 1,834,942 $104.063 $313.955e+03 $576.089e+09
Corrected to ”B” 0 0 $0 $0 $0
Corrected to ”S” 2,653 10,282 $102.33 $793.004e+03 $8.154e+09
Sub-table B:
Total 409,414 3,776,314 $104.664 $518.227e+03 $1,956.989e+09
Corrected to ”D” 241,826 733,104 $104.434 $756.894e+03 $554.882e+09
Corrected to ”B” 0 0 $0 $0 $0
Corrected to ”S” 2,456 6,678 $101.877 $1,210.14e+03 $8.081e+09
3.3.1 Data Description
The data were obtained from the Municipal Securities Regulatory Board (MSRB) and com-
prise daily trading in Municipal bonds spanning the calendar year from June 1, 2015 to
May 31, 2016. The MSRB collects these data as part of its Regulatory mandate. The data
fields include anonymized but unique identifiers for dealers that participated in a given trade
reported in the data sample. Additionally, the data sample contains a field that identifies a
reported trade as a ”Dealer-Buy”, ”Dealer-Sell”, or ”Inter-Dealer” trade, respectively with
the letters ”B”, ”S”, or ”D”. If a trade is marked a ”B”, the field containing the identifier
for the buying dealer is populated whereas that for the selling dealer is left empty. Similarly,
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the field containing the identifier for the selling dealer is populated and that for the buying
dealer left blank for trades marked ”S”; for trades marked ”D” the fields for the buying and
selling dealers are both populated. Only trades marked ”D”, and thus have both the buying
and selling dealers’ fields populated, were retained for further study, as this work focuses
primarily on inter-dealer trading networks. Trades that were marked with an ”S” or ”B” but
had both the dealer buy and sell fields populated were considered to have been erroneously
labelled and they were corrected to be marked ”D” and retained for further analysis. Table
3.1 shows two sub-tables, named A and B, which give break-downs of data counts and sum-
maries of the trades that were corrected. The two sub-tables respectively show information
for the entire data sample, and a sub-sample of the data that was filtered to include only
trades of a par-traded-amount larger or equal to $50,000 and a price greater than $1 of par.
See Appendix B: ”Script for preprocessing the data to feed the C++ program” for code that
was used to perform the preprocessing described here.
Going by the unique identifiers used in the data to mark unique dealers, there are
about 3,266 unique dealers identified in the data, and when filtered to contain only trades
with a traded par-amount of over $50,000 and trade price of $1 of par there are about 2,969
unique dealers identified in the data. If a dealer traded with another dealer in a trade par-
amount of $1MM or more over the period of the data sample, the two dealers are identified
to be connected; filtering the data by this criterion combined with that of the trade price
of $1 of par, there are 1,398 unique dealers. This trade par amount criterion mirrors that
of Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2017) for choosing dealer links that reflect established
trading relationships. Whereas in their paper they used the cummulative sum of par amount
traded in their sample period of one year to establish the existence of trading relationships
among traders, this study uses the par amount of individual trades. Consequently, our
criterion of $1MM is a scaled down version of theirs of $5MM to adjust for the fact that
ours is on a per-trade basis whereas theirs is a cummulative sum over the sample period.
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Figure 3.1: Dealer Network Centrality Characteristics







































































Degree Distributions for Theoretical Random Network Compared to Trading Network
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Henceforth, the data subsample meeting this criterion will be referred to as the working
subsample.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Dealers’ Eigen Centrality
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.0000 0.0099 0.0285 0.1140 0.1413 1.0000
Figure 3.1 shows a frequency distribution of the number of connections the various
dealers in the working subsample have. This chart is compared with the probability distri-
bution of the number of connections within a network which has its connections randomly
generated, that is, the Poisson random network. The differences between the frequency plots
of the actual network versus the theoretical network (the Poisson random network) indicate
that the trading network formed in the Municipal bond market isn’t random, as the random
search and match theory of OTC market trading (Duffie, et. al. (2005)) might suggest.
Rather the log-log plot at the bottom of the panel in figure 3.1 suggests that the trading
network is a scale-free network, since this plot depicts linearity as would be expected from
the log-log plot of a scale-free network. It is also worth mentioning that a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test conducted to compare the two distributions rejected the null at a significance
level of 0.005. Table 3.2 shows a summary of the number of connections in the form of the
eigen-centrality measure (see measures of network centrality; Jackson (2008, p. 61 - 69)).
Figure 3.4 provides a visual representation of the trading network involving trades that are
$1MM or more and have a price of $1 or more of par.
To construct the CUSIP-time identifiers described in section 2.4, the CUSIP of each
trade in the working subsample was appended with the calendar date of the trade. After
this, all CUSIP-time IDs that were executed by the same counterparties on both the buy
and the sell sides of the trade at a price within $0.01 of par were combined into one trade
and their traded notional amounts added together. After this cleaning step, there were
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Frequency Density of Price
155,051 unique CUSIP-time IDs remaining, in which a total of 221,153 trades were executed
by the 1,398 unique dealers in 12,307 unique bilateral transactions. This produced a sparse
matrix representation of the total network’s adjacency matrix having 24,614 entries (12,307
multiplied by 2 counterparties in each bilateral trade).
3.3.2 The Trading Network and Estimation
Considering that the final, preprocessed data-set contained 1,398 unique dealers, the full
network adjacency matrix in dense matrix representation would be a 1398-by-1398 matrix,
which will have over 1.9 million cells. Storage and computation with a matrix of this size
is unwieldy. As such, making use of the sparsity of the adjancency matrix (only 12,307
multiplied by 2 cells being non-zero, i.e. having connections), a Compressed Row Storage
format is used to represent the network’s adjancency matrix as a sparse matrix structure.
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The algorithm in Algorithm 1 details how the sparse matrix structure for the network was
built, and the full program that implements this algorithm is shown in Appendix B: ”C++
code for generating Sparse matrix structure and building the data for the Stan program”. In
addition to building the sparse matrix structures from the raw data, this piece of code also
builds the data structures needed to feed the Stan probabilistic programming language for
estimation.
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Data: int bd, sd; map<int, set<int> > mp
Result: vector<int> uA, vA; vector<float> wA
Init:
int ct = 1;
mp = map<int, set<int> >();
while not at end of data-file do
foreach data row do
bd = buying dealer’s id;
sd = selling dealer’s id;
if set for bd exists in mp then
insert sd into bd’s set; i.e. mp[bd].insert(sd);
else
create set for bd in mp; i.e. mp[bd] = set<int>();
insert sd into bd’s set; i.e. mp[bd].insert(sd);
end
if set exists for sd then
insert bd into sd’s set; i.e. mp[sd].insert(bd);
else
create set for sd in mp; i.e. mp[sd] = set<int>();




initialize the size of vector uA to the number of entries in mp plus 1, and fill it with zeros;
foreach pair(int, set<int>) in mp do
get first element in the pair which is an index for dealer; i.e. int r = pair.first;
get second element in the pair which is a set containing indexes for dealers in r’s
network; i.e. set<int> st = pair.second;
get the number of elements in dealers r’s network; i.e. int sz = st.size(); Note that the
dealer id, r, also corresponds to the adjacency matrix’s (row number-1);
for int q = ct+1; q < r; ++q do
uA[q] = uA[q-1];
end
uA[r] = uA[r-1] + sz;
ct = r;
foreach vt in st do loop through indexes for dealers in r’s network
insert each dealer’s index into columns vector; i.e. vA.push back(vt);
end
end
Algorithm 1: Sparse matrix algorithm for Trading Network
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Using the CMDSTAN interface, the Stan program was run for 900 Warm-up iterations
and 100 Sampling iterations. Four independent chains of the markov-chain were initiated
and were distinguished by using different initialization seeds for the HMC-NUTS sampler as
follows: chain 1 (seed=12345), chain 1 (seed=1234), chain 1 (seed=123), chain 1 (seed=12).
A total of about 2,567,877 parameters were estimated, including hyperparameters and inter-
mediate parameters, such as ē
(a)
{i,j} pairs together with their corresponding pairs e
(a)
{i,j}’s from
section (2.5.1), introduced to facilitate improved inference.
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Figure 3.4: Visualization of Dealer Trading Network
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3.4 Estimation Results
In this section, results of the estimation procedure to determine the endogenous parameters
of the OTC trading network are presented. The trade prices in the working subsample were
all scaled by 100 to bring the range of the original prices in the interval [1, 189] to the interval
[0.01, 1.89], with the quartiles of scaled prices as follows: first quartile is 1, second quartile
is 1.0589, third quartile is 1.1535, and the mean is 1.0579. The traded par-amounts were
also scaled by 1,000,000 to produce traded quantities in the interval [1, 950], with the first,
second, and third quartiles respectively at 1.123, 2.0, and 4.02. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3
respectively show density plots of the price and the log of the par-traded quantities using
the working subsample.
3.4.1 General Network-level Results
This subsection presents aspects of the estimation results that are general to the entire trad-
ing network, and offers interpretations to the main observations they represent. Results from
the four separate Markov chains that were run for inference were aggregated and summarized
together using the Stan software’s summary tool.
Table 3.3 shows that the posterior distribution has a fairly low variance, considering
that each of the network level parameters reported in the table has its standard deviation
lower in magnitude than its mean, except for intps, γ, and w1. The 5
th to 95th percentile
ranges of each parameter is also narrow, with most of the parameters having their mean
and median almost aligned, giving further indication that the posterior distribution is not
diffuse. This observation bears out the methodological innovation introduced in section 2.4,
which culminated in Hypothesis 2.2, to use the same long-lived network connections already
in place (precisely, the same parameterization for the existing network) for repeated trading
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Table 3.3: Select Estimated Parameters
Parameter Mean StdDev 5th % 50th % 95th %
ρ 0.55 0.20 0.26 0.62 0.80
σ 3.40 2.00 0.79 3.30 6.40
ζ 1.20 0.98 0.18 1.30 2.70
intpm -1.00 0.39 -1.40 -1.00 -0.37
intps 1.60 2.20 0.24 0.36 5.40
v 3.90 2.40 0.46 4.10 7.10
γ 1.50 1.80 0.24 0.63 4.70
µ 0.92 0.75 -0.061 1.40 1.90
λ 1.80 1.30 0.18 2.80 3.20
α1 2.30 1.20 0.99 2.10 4.30
α2 2.00 1.00 0.42 2.80 3.00
w1 2.2 2.8 0.17 1.50 7.00
w2 3.00 2.10 0.91 3.00 6.30
τ1 0.77 0.43 0.25 0.97 1.40
τ2 0.64 0.25 0.37 0.82 0.95
of potentially different securities and potentially varying subnetworks (i.e. sets of nodes
(dealers) that are vary from one trade to the next). An outright repudiation of Hypothesis
2.2 would mean seeing in the estimation results a widely varying posterior distribution for
the estimated parameters, but that obviously isn’t the case as we see in Table 3.3.
The first parameter, ρ, which is the square of the correlation determining the extent to
which dealers in the network’s valuations of an asset are common, has a mean value of 0.55.
This represents an actual correlation of about 0.742 among dealers’ asset valuations within
the network. This correlation value implies that asset valuations across dealers within the
OTC trading network are quite high for Municipal bonds trading. This observation supports
the assertion by Li and Schurhoff (2019) that trading in Municipal bonds is driven more by
liquidity needs and less by private information. On the otherhand, σ reflects a dispersion of
valuations across securities, and a value of 3.40 implies a variance of 11.56, which is quite
high and aligns with the observation that the traded prices range from $1 to $189 of par. The
estimate for ζ of 1.20 represents a slightly larger dealer-level valuation signal noise relative
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to the dispersion of valuations across securities. The mean of the distribution for security
fixed-effect, intpm, is -1.00 indicating a downward bias, with a standard deviation of 0.39
(variance of 0.152) indicating fairly low dispersion across securities. The shape parameter,
v, for the network-wide exogenous demand paramater, β̄, is 3.90 and its rate parameter, γ,
is 1.50, implying that β̄ has a mean of 2.6 and variance of 1.73. The trade-specific price
effects, ∆p, have a mean (µ) of 0.92 and standard deviation (λ) of 1.80 which represents a
fairly low variance of 3.24. The trade-specific exogenous demand parameter, β, has a shape
and a rate parameter respectively of (α1 = 2.30) and (α2 = 2.00) implying that its mean is
1.15 and its variance is a 0.575.
Considering that the model calculated prices and quantities for each datapoint in the
Bayesian estimation represents a random draw from the resulting posterior distribution, an
aggregation of these model calculated values for each data-point was performed using bins
shown in Appendix B: ”Aggregation bins for Model-calculated Trade Price and Quantities”,
to capture trends across several draws from the posterior to compute correlations between
the model result and the actual data. The correlations so computed between actual and
model price is 0.245, and that between actual and model quantity is 0.281. These provide a
proxy for the goodness of fit, as there is no R-square to report in this context.
3.4.2 Trades, Valuation Signals, and the Conditional Guessing
Game Equilibrium
As described in section 1.3, Babus and Kondor (2018) show that their methodological innova-
tion, the Conditional Guessing Game Equilibrium (CGGE), yields a solution that converges
to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and that result is a fundamental premise of the
methodological approach that was derived in Chapter 1. Going forward, CGGE and BNE
shall be used interchangeably.
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Table 3.4 shows correlations measured between the actual trade prices and, respec-
tively, Buyers’ CGGE signals and Sellers’ CGGE signals; between actual trade quantities
and, respectively, Buyers’ CGGE signals and Sellers’ CGGE signals; between the traded as-
sets’ common valuations among dealers and, respectively, Buyers’ CGGE signals and Sellers’
CGGE signals; between actual trade prices and, respectively, the traded assets’ common
valuations among dealers and the mean of the distribution for the traded assets’ common
valuations; and finally, between actual trade quantities and, respectively, the traded assets’
common valuations among dealers and the mean of the distribution for the traded assets’
common valuations. In the table, the traded assets’ common valuations among dealers is
symbolized by Θ and the mean of its distribution symbolized by Θm. The correlations in the
table were measured using aggregations based on bins for actual trade prices, as described
in Appendix B: ”Aggregation bins for Model-calculated Trade Price and Quantities”.
Table 3.4: CGGE Signals, Valuation Signals, and Trade Prices & Quantities
Measurement Value
Cor(ActualPrice, Seller CGGE Signal) -0.0969
Cor(ActualPrice, Buyer CGGE Signal) 0.0254
Cor(ActualPrice, MeanCommonVal (Θm)) 0.2933
Cor(ActualPrice, SecurityCommonVal (Θ)) 0.0645
Cor(ActualQuantity, Seller CGGE Signal) 0.1280
Cor(ActualQuantity, Buyer CGGE Signal) 0.4157
Cor(ActualQuantity, MeanCommonVal (Θm)) -0.1072
Cor(ActualQuantity, SecurityCommonVal (Θ)) -0.1177
Cor(SecurityCommonVal (Θ), Seller CGGE Signal) -0.1775
Cor(SecurityCommonVal (Θ), Buyer CGGE Signal) 0.0485
From Table 3.4, it is evident that trade prices correlate weakly positively with Buyer
CGGE signals and weakly negatively with Seller CGGE signals (respectively 0.0254 and
-0.0969), whereas for traded quantities the correlations are stronger and positve for both
Buyer and Seller CGGE signals, respectively 0.4157 and 0.1280. This observation aligns
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with the intuition that both buying and selling dealers want to maximize profit and so
buyers buy more aggressively (in par amount; likewise, sellers sell less aggressively) when
the CGGE signal is stronger. The aggressive buying that takes place when the CGGE signal
is stronger induces the weaker positive correlation of the Buyer CGGE signal with price,
whereas the less aggressive selling induces the weaker negative correlation between prices
and the Seller CGGE signal. Also, we see that the dealers’ common valuations of assets
traded within the network, as well as the mean of this quantity’s distribution both correlate
positively with actual prices (respectively, 0.0645 and 0.2933) and negatively with actual
quantities (respectively, -0.1177 and -0.1072). This is a manifestation of the residual demand
curve being negatively sloping. Finally, we see that the dealers’ common valuations of assets
traded within the network correlate positively with Buyer CGGE signals and negatively
with Seller CGGE signals (respectively 0.0485 and -0.1775), and again this aligns with the
intuition that agents want to maximize profits and so their rational decision would be to sell
when their valuations of the asset is unfavorable and buy when their valuations of the asset
is favorable.
Table 3.5: Further Indicative Measures of CGGE
Measurement Value
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff (∆p), TradeQtyFixedEff (β)) 0.1205
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff (∆p), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.1707
Cor(ActualPrice, ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.1462
Cor(ActualQuantity, ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) -0.4362
Cor(TradeQtyFixedEff (β), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.0482
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmPriceDeviation) 0.1256
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmQtyDeviation) 0.1286
Following from the formulation of price in equation (2.1), ∆p in table 3.5 repre-
sents deviations from the CGGE price, whereas β represents the exogenous demand devia-
tion factor in equation (2.2) that multiplies ∆p to produce the deviations from the CGGE
61
traded-quantities (which itself is called ”EqmQtyDeviation” in table 3.5). The slope of the
exogenous customer demand curve (-βij from equation (1.2)) is represented by β̄ in table
3.5, hence β̄ is strictly positive. Similarly, β is strictly positive and can be interpretated
as a negated version of the slope of demand in excess of the CGGE demand. A positive
correlation of 0.1205 between ∆p and β indicates that positive price deviations from equilib-
rium causes the curve for the demand that is in excess of the CGGE demand to steepen. A
correlation of 0.1707 between ∆p and β̄ can be interpreted to mean that the more inelastic
the exogenous customer demand, the larger the positive deviations from the CGGE price,
which aligns with the intuition that larger markups would lead to larger prices charged the
exogenous customers in excess of equilibrium prices. In the same vein, a correlation of 0.1462
is observed between actual trade prices and β̄, again reflecting the notion that a more in-
elastic exogenous customer demand curve will result in higher prices. The converse of this
argument is again buttressed by the observed correlation of -0.4362 between actual traded
quantities and β̄, which means the more inelastic the exogenous customer demand curve the
lower the traded quantities become. Next, the correlations between β̄ and, respectively, the
total deviation from CGGE prices, the total deviation from CGGE quantities, and β, all
reflect the notion that a steeper exogenous customer demand curve induces larger positive
deviations from the CGGE equilibrium.
So far, the analyses in this subsection have used aggregation based on the ”Trade-
Price” bins, as shown in Appendix B and mentioned earlier in this section. In table 3.6, a
selection of the salient measures that have been shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5 are repeated
using the ”Quantity-Traded” bins shown in Appendix B. All of the measures shown in table
3.6 directionally align with their counterparts in tables 3.4 and 3.5, and show stronger
effects (i.e. larger correlations in magnitude). Of course, there are a few others like the ones
including the common valuations of the traded asset and the mean of its distribution that
change sign when looked at. One explanation for both the ones showing stronger effects
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and the ones that change sign of their effects under the ”Quantity-Traded” bins is that the
”Quantity-Traded” bins are much less finer than the groupings that are obtained under the
”Trade-Price” bins. Consequently the effects that are less diffuse become more concentrated
and produce larger correlations, whereas the effects that are relatively more diffuse can easily
change sign. And so, the ”Trade-Price” bins will be used for the rest of the analyses in this
chapter.
Table 3.6: Indicative Measures using ”Quantity-Traded” bins
Measurement Value
Cor(ActualPrice, Seller CGGE Signal) -0.379510
Cor(ActualPrice, Buyer CGGE Signal) 0.158960
Cor(ActualQuantity, EqmSellSignal) 0.209423
Cor(ActualQuantity, EqmBuySignal) 0.388884
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), TradeQtyFixedEff (β)) 0.528996
Cor(ActualPrice, ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.543989
Cor(ActualQuantity, ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) -0.653401
3.4.3 Centrality and Equilibrium
The foregone analyses have considered the dealers in the trading network to be homogenous,
whereas the literature is replete with evidence that a dealer’s centrality within the trading
network has relevance for that dealer’s strategic behavior within the network (Hollifield
et. al. (2017), Li and Schuroff (2019)). In this subsection, observations made from the
estimation results relating to how central versus peripheral dealers’ trading relate to the
BNE equilibrium are discussed. Defining centrality by eigen centrality, the charts in figures
3.5 and 3.6 show that the more central a dealer is in the network the closer, on average,
that dealer’s trade prices and quantities are to the OTC Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE)
prices and quantities as determined by the CGGE.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Price Behavior: Working Subsample
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Plots of Equilibrium Price Behavior vs. Eigen Centrality










ij represents the CGGE price in equation (1.10), intp
(a) represents a CUSIP-time ID specific
constant (the security fixed-effect), and ∆p
(a)
ij represents a trade specific constant (the trade
fixed-effect). Each of the charts in Figure 3.5 has on its horizontal axis the eigen centrality






ij , grouped either by buying dealers or by selling dealers.
Similarly, figure 3.6 shows the behavior in equilibrium of the formulation for traded
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium Quantity Behavior: Working Subsample
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Plots of Equilibrium Behavior of Par−Amount Traded (Quantity) vs Eigen Centrality
par-amount as shown in equation (2.2), which is an extension of the formula in equation

















(a)) represents the total
deviation of the traded quantity from the CGGE equilibrium value, with β
(a)
ij representing
a trade specific constant. Each of the charts in Figure 3.6 has on its horizontal axis the








(a)), grouped either by buying dealers or by selling dealers.
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Both figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the same pattern, where the values on the vertical axes
shrink down towards zero as the eigen centrality measure increases, except for the case of β
(a)
ij
where the values on the vertical axis shrink towards a level just below 2 in a manner similar
to how the others shrink towards zero. These observations imply that the more central a
dealer’s position within the trading network, the less exposed to information asymmetries
they are when they trade, since their trades occur at or near the CGGE (BNE) price and
demand quantity. This observation aligns with the finding by Li and Schuroff (2019), which
also states that central dealers are exposed less to information asymmetries in the Municipal
bonds market. Translated into the context of these charts, their statement on information
asymmetries would comprise the deviations from the equilibrium (CGGE/BNE) price and
demand quantity levels.
Expanding the data-sample to include trades of par-amount $50,000 or larger, the
charts in figure 3.7 show similar plots as in figure 3.5. Also, similar in behavior to those in
figure 3.5, they show convergence to equilibrium versus centrality, and reassert the behavior
seen in the graphs of figure 3.5. Even though this larger sample, about ten times the size
of the working subsample, intuitively would be noisier and tend to obscure most of the other
strategic phenomena of the OTC network seen in 3.5, it still shows the main behavior
pattern that has been observed regarding how equilibrium might be attained in Municipal
bonds inter-dealer trading network.
3.4.4 Behavior of Central and Peripheral Dealers within the Trad-
ing Network
A further analysis of the central/peripheral dealer dichotomy is undertaken in this subsection
to provide a closer look at central and peripheral dealers’ strategic behavior within the
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Figure 3.7: Central Dealer Equilibrium Behavior: Larger Sample




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Plots of Equilibrium Behavior vs. Centrality For Trade−size >= $50K
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trading network. Throughout the analyses that follow from here, the degree centrality is
used as the measure of centrality to help with intuitive interpreting of the results here, and
addtionally a central dealer is defined to be one who has traded with fifty (50) or more other
dealers in the sample. Wherever the need to use an alternate measure of centrality arises, a
statement will be made to point that out.
Table 3.7: Central Buying-Dealer Trading Behavior
Measurement Value
Cor(ActualPrice, SellingDlrSig (s)) 0.2438
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellingDlrSig (s)) -0.3112
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyingDlrSig (s)) 0.37
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyingDlrSig (s)) -0.0483
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyerSigWeight (y)) 0.2416
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyerSigWeight (y)) 0.2265
Cor(ActualPrice, SellerSigWeight (y)) -0.5454
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellerSigWeight (y)) 0.1825
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) 0.6664
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) -0.2794
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) 0.5573
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) -0.2575
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), TradeQtyFixedEff (β)) 0.1692
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.1683
Cor(TradeQtyFixedEff (β), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.1991
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmPriceDeviation) 0.1613
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmQtyDeviation) 0.1465
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 group Buying-dealers and further separate them into central dealers
in table 3.7 and peripheral dealers in table 3.8. Similarly, tables 3.9 and 3.10 group Selling-
dealers and further separate them into central dealers in table 3.9 and peripheral dealers in
table 3.10. In these tables, s is the dealer’s initial (apriori) valuation signal (si from equation
(1.1)), y is the weight the dealer places on this apriori valuation signal (yi from equation
(1.1)) when he engages other dealers in the market during OTC price discovery, and z is the
information-asymmetry weight the a dealer counterparty assigns to the he gleans from his
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interaction with the counterparty (from equation (1.7), it is zij for the buying dealer and zji
for the selling dealer).
The Selling-dealers with whom central Buying-dealers interact don’t necessarily have
unfavorable valuations, judging from a corelation of 0.2438 (from table 3.7) between actual
trade prices and these Selling-dealers’ apriori valuation signals, and this observation might
very well be an indication of a dearth of bargaining power on their part when they go to the
marketplace to trade. Compared with Selling-dealers with whom peripheral Buying-dealers
interact (same correlation is -0.5504, from table 3.8), Selling-dealers who are themselves
central dealers (same correlation is -0.0867, from table 3.9), and Selling-dealers who are
themselves peripheral dealers (same correlation is 0.1349, from table 3.10), we see that
peripheral buying dealers are the most disadvantaged since their counterparties appear to
dump their holdings on them when they have highly unfavorable valuations of the asset being
traded (-0.5504 correlation). Selling-dealers who are themselves central dealers also wield a
degree of advantage, because when they sell, they have a somewhat unfavorable valuation of
the traded asset (-0.0867 correlation). Next, Selling-dealers who are themselves peripheral
dealers appear to also lack power in the marketplace, similarly as that for Selling-dealers
with whom central Buying-dealers interact (0.1349 correlation).
The central Buying-dealers appear to wield great advantage, judging from a correlation
of 0.37 (from table 3.7) between actual trade prices and these Buying-dealers’ apriori valu-
ation signals, and this observation might be due to central dealers having a larger number
of other dealers within their network with whom they can trade, which in turn gives them
bargaining power in the marketplace. Compared with peripheral Buying-dealers (same cor-
relation is 0.2318, from table 3.8), Buying-dealers who interact with central Selling-dealers
(same correlation is 0.4244, from table 3.9), and Buying-dealers who interact with periph-
eral Selling-dealers (same correlation is 0.3434, from table 3.10), Buying-dealers in general
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Table 3.8: Peripheral Buying-Dealer Trading Behavior
Measurement Value
Cor(ActualPrice, SellingDlrSig (s)) -0.5504
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellingDlrSig (s)) 0.0627
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyingDlrSig (s)) 0.2318
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyingDlrSig (s)) -0.1308
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyerSigWeight (y)) -0.6773
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyerSigWeight (y)) 0.2101
Cor(ActualPrice, SellerSigWeight (y)) -0.3667
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellerSigWeight (y)) -0.2608
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) -0.5295
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) 0.1179
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) -0.324
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) 0.0324
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), TradeQtyFixedEff (β)) 0.0866
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.0402
Cor(TradeQtyFixedEff (β), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) -0.0918
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmPriceDeviation) 0.1758
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmQtyDeviation) 0.2346
apparently have favorable valuations of the assets in which they trade.
For central Buying-dealers, they weight higher their apriori valuation signals of the
traded asset when the price is higher, judging from a correlation of 0.2416 (from table 3.7)
between actual trade prices and these Buying-dealers’ weights they put on their apriori val-
uation signals, and this observation apparently is due to the fact that a buyer would have a
stronger conviction in his decision to buy. Compared with peripheral Buying-dealers (same
correlation is -0.6773, from table 3.8), Buying-dealers who interact with central Selling-
dealers (same correlation is -0.3699, from table 3.9), and Buying-dealers who interact with
peripheral Selling-dealers (same correlation is -0.5776, from table 3.10), it appears that
central Buying-dealers are the only group who places greater emphasis on their own valua-
tions when the price of the traded asset is higher. The remaining other groups, i.e peripheral
Buying-dealers, Buying-dealers who interact with central Selling-dealers, and Buying-dealers
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Table 3.9: Central Selling-Dealer Trading Behavior
Measurement Value
Cor(ActualPrice, SellingDlrSig (s)) -0.0867
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellingDlrSig (s)) -0.0553
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyingDlrSig (s)) 0.4244
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyingDlrSig (s)) -0.1494
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyerSigWeight (y)) -0.3698
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyerSigWeight (y)) 0.6306
Cor(ActualPrice, SellerSigWeight (y)) -0.2081
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellerSigWeight (y)) -0.2066
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) 0.4355
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) -0.3189
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) 0.2788
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) -0.43
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), TradeQtyFixedEff (β)) 0.2502
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.0344
Cor(TradeQtyFixedEff (β), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) -0.1261
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmPriceDeviation) 0.0175
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmQtyDeviation) 0.0513
who interact with peripheral Selling-dealers all deemphasize their own apriori valuations,
apparently in a bid to learn more about the asset’s value by gleaning further information
through information diffusion from price discovery.
Selling-dealers who interact with central Buying-dealers deemphasize their own apriori
valuation signals, judging from a correlation of -0.5454 (from table 3.7) between actual trade
prices and these Selling-dealers’ weights they put on their apriori valuation signals. The
magnitude of this negative correlation is quite high, giving an indication that these Selling-
dealers enthusiastically expect to learn a lot more about the asset’s value when they interact
with their central Buying-dealer counterparties, evidently because these counterparties are
better positioned within the network to be better informed. Compared with Selling-dealers
who interact with peripheral Buying-dealers (same correlation is -0.3667, from table 3.8),
Selling-dealers who are themselves central dealers (same correlation is -0.3667, from table
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Table 3.10: Peripheral Selling-Dealer Trading Behavior
Measurement Value
Cor(ActualPrice, SellingDlrSig (s)) 0.1349
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellingDlrSig (s)) -0.3548
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyingDlrSig (s)) 0.3434
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyingDlrSig (s)) -0.1408
Cor(ActualPrice, BuyerSigWeight (y)) -0.5776
Cor(ActualQuantity, BuyerSigWeight (y)) 0.0393
Cor(ActualPrice, SellerSigWeight (y)) -0.6792
Cor(ActualQuantity, SellerSigWeight (y)) 0.0734
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) -0.0082
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Buyer (z)) -0.0185
Cor(ActualPrice, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) 0.4324
Cor(ActualQuantity, InfoAsymWeight Seller (z)) 0.0302
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), TradeQtyFixedEff (β)) -0.1906
Cor(TradePriceFixedEff(∆p), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) 0.2657
Cor(TradeQtyFixedEff (β), ExogDemandSlope(β̄)) -0.0728
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmPriceDeviation) 0.2662
Cor(ExogDemandSlope(β̄), EqmQtyDeviation) 0.2655
3.9), and Selling-dealers who are themselves peripheral dealers (same correlation is -0.6792,
from table 3.10), it appears there’s more to the observed negative correlations than just
wanting to learn from information diffusion during price discovery. Evidently, a dealer would
sell when they have an unfavorable view of holding the asset; this view appears to interact
with the dealer’s propensity to want to learn more through information diffusion when it
is opportune to do so. A consequence of this interaction is the relatively large negative
correlations all across (-0.5454, -0.3667, -0.3667, and -0.6792).
Trade counterparties who transact with central Buying-dealers in the interdealer trad-
ing network put higher weights on the information diffusion signals they get from the central
Buying-dealers the higher the transaction price, this is manifested in the high positive cor-
relation of 0.6664 (from table 3.7) between actual trade prices and the Information Weight
placed on signals gleaned from the central Buying-dealers. Evidently, when a dealer is buy-
ing, he must have a favorable valuation of the asset, as we saw in a previous paragraph.
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Consequently, others would consider with seriousness valuation (price) signals they glean
from him, this seriousness becomes further heightened when the Buying-dealer is central,
for the obvious reason that a central dealer has a larger count of other dealers within his
network and by this virtue sees more information. Compared with the weights that coun-
terparties who transact with peripheral Buying-dealers put on those dealers’ price signals
(same correlation is -0.5295, from table 3.8), the weights that central Selling-dealers put on
their transaction counterparties’ price signals (same correlation is 0.4355, from table 3.9),
and the weights that peripheral Selling-dealers put on their transaction counterparties’ price
signals (same correlation is -0.0082, from table 3.10). We see that central Selling-dealers
also value more the price signals from their counterparties the higher the actual transaction
prices possibly because these counterparties might also be quite central by self-selection,
which if true suggests the existence of symmetry that we should expect to see in other mea-
sures that are considered. The counterparties of peripheral Buying-dealers value their price
signals less the higher the trade price, and so does the peripheral Selling-dealers do the price
signals of their buying counterparties, quite possibly because they consider these signals to
not be sufficiently informative and so would want to lower their exposure to loss the higher
the actual transaction prices.
Central Buying-dealers emphasize the price signals that diffuse from their trade coun-
terparties more with increasing transaction price, the correlation between actual trade prices
and the weight these central Buying-dealers put on their counterparties’ price signals is
0.5573 (from table 3.7). This observation reflects the symmetry suggested in the preced-
ing paragraphs, in that the central Buying-dealers would also have counterparties who are
themselves central, as was inferred in the preceding paragraph when it was conjectured
that central Selling-dealers might have counterparties that are themselves central too. This
correlation compared with how much peripheral Buying-dealers emphasize their counter-
parties’ price signals, how much the counterparties of central Selling-dealers emphasize the
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Selling-dealers’ price signal, and how much the counterparties of peripheral Selling-dealers
emphasize the Selling-dealers’ price signal, we have the following correlations respectively:
-0.324 (from table 3.8), 0.2788 (from table 3.9), and 0.4324 (from table 3.10). Peripheral
Buying-dealers emphasize their counterparties’ price signal less the larger the transaction
price, possibly because it isn’t sufficiently informative. The counterparties of both central
and peripheral Selling-dealers emphasize the selling dealer’s price signal more, the greater
the transaction price.
Whenever the trade-specific price-fixed-effects, ∆p, become more positive, the ”excess”
exogenous demand factor, β also increases, noting that β is strictly positive. This is true for
both central and peripheral Buying-dealers, as well as central Selling-dealers, with respective
correlations of 0.1692 (from table 3.7), 0.0866 (from table 3.8), and 0.2502 (from table 3.9),
and is an indication that for these three categories of dealers, increased exogenous demand
is associated with positive price changes. There is no information from this result, however,
about causal direction but it must be noted that this observation aligns with the notion in
section 2.3 that increased exogenous demand is associated with price changes (in this case
postive price changes). For peripheral Selling-dealers, the correlation is -0.1906 (from table
3.10), indicating that positive price changes are associated with decreases in the ”excess”
exogenous demand factor. The dichotomy between the observation for peripheral Selling-
dealers versus the other dealer categories suggest that peripheral Selling-dealers lack the
market power to benefit from more profitable selling in the sense that profittable selling is
associated with being able to sell at the higher prices that the positive price changes create,
hence the stark difference in correlations of 0.2502 for central and -0.1906 for peripheral
Selling-dealers. On the part of Buying-dealers, the positive price changes is a manifestation
of the strong valuations that buying dealers have when they engage during such transactions,
as observed from a strong positive correlation for central Buying-dealers their CGGE signal
and ∆p of 0.2047.
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Slope of the exogenous customer demand curve, β̄, correlates positively with trade-
specific price-fixed-effects, ∆p, across all four categories of dealers, indicating that the more
inelastic the exogenous customer demand is, the larger the price deviations from equilibrium
become – thus, this behavior remains completely intact as it has been at the aggregate
level, seen in section 3.4.2. Further, it is observed that a more inelastic exogenous customer
demand drives larger deviations both from the trade price and quantities equilibrium levels.
This is seen in the respective correlations for central and peripheral Buying-dealers and
Selling-dealers of 0.1613 (from table 3.7), 0.1758 (from table 3.8), 0.0175 (from table 3.9),
0.2662 (from table 3.10) for the trade prices. The same respective correlations for trade
quantities are 0.1465 (from table 3.7), 0.2346 (from table 3.8), 0.0513 (from table 3.9),
0.2655 (from table 3.10).
3.4.5 The Degree of Centrality and Dealers’ Strategic Behavior
This subsection focuses primarily on central dealers, i.e. dealers with at least 50 or more
other dealers in their networks. Referring to the measurements shown in Table 3.11, degree
centrality is found to correlate negatively with the weight (yi in equations (1.1) and (1.6),
and referred to in this section as ”WgtOnOwnSignal (y)”) that a central dealer places on her
own initial valuation signal. Buying dealers doing so to a larger degree (with a correlation
of -0.4048) than selling dealers do (with a correlation of -0.3627), indicating that central
dealers place less emphasis on their own apriori valuations, and the degree to which they
do so intensifies the greater the centrality of the dealer. This must be a consequence of the
fact that central dealers have a greater number of connections from whom to glean further
information to refine their apriori valuations of the traded asset.
When central dealers are buyers, their counterparties have a positive correlation of
0.0334 between the degree to which the dealer is central (”ByrDegCentr”) and the weight
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Table 3.11: Central Dealer Trading Behavior versus Degree Centrality
Measurement Value
Cor(ByrDegCentr, WgtOnOwnSignal (y)) -0.4048
Cor(SlrDegCentr, WgtOnOwnSignal (y)) -0.3627
Cor(ByrDegCentr, CntrPtyWgtOnSig (z b)) 0.0334
Cor(ByrDegCentr, Mean WgtOnCntrPtySig (b z)) 0.2324
Cor(SlrDegCentr, CntrPtyWgtOnSig (z s)) -0.0437
Cor(SlrDegCentr, Mean WgtOnCntrPtySig (s z)) -0.1433
these counterparties put on the price signals they glean from the central dealer (”CntrP-
tyWgtOnSig (z b)”). Conversely, these buying central dealers put larger weights on their
counterparties’s price signals (”Mean WgtOnCntrPtySig (b z)”) the more central they are,
judging from the positive correlation of 0.2324. Considering that ∂p
∂z
< 0, where p is the
transaction price and z is the information asymmetry weight, these positive correlations
mean that buying central dealers want to buy at lower prices, while their counterparties try
less successfully to push up the prices. Eventually the central dealer wins and can maximize
his profit (by buying at a lower price) than the counterparty would.
When central dealers are sellers, their counterparties have a negative correlation of
-0.0437 between the degree to which the dealer is central (”SlrDegCentr”) and the weight
these counterparties put on the price signals they glean from the central dealer (”CntrP-
tyWgtOnSig (z s)”). Conversely, these selling central dealers put smaller weights on their
counterparties’s price signals (”Mean WgtOnCntrPtySig (s z)”) the more central they are,
judging from the negative correlation of -0.1433. Again, invoking the condition that ∂p
∂z
< 0,
we see that the central dealer yet again is more successful in achieving his profit maximiza-
tion goals than his counterparties are, considering that putting smaller weights on the price
signals he succeeds in pushing higher the transaction price and thereby make greater profits
at the expense of the counterparty who less successfully tries to push the transaction price
downwards.
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Consequently, it is evident that the more central a dealer is within the network, the
greater market power that dealer wields, which he harnesses to advance his strategic goal of
maximizing his profits from transactions in which he engages within the network.
3.5 Conclusion
In the foregone, we have seen that the endogenous parameters of an OTC trading network
can be estimated, using a hierarchical probability model that is implemented by Bayesian
inference through the CmdStan interface to the Stan probabilistic programming language.
We have seen that this inference method, implementing the No-U-Turn-Sampling variation
of Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo for the computations, has made it possible to estimate the over
two-million parameters necessary to accomplish the task at hand. Equipped with results of
these direct estimates of the OTC trading network in the Municipal bonds market, we have
been able to make precise characterizations of the dealers’ behavior in that market.
Judging from the mean estimate of the squared-correlation parameter, ρ, in section
3.4.1, we have seen that private information drives about 45% of the variance of valuations
signals, ex the signal observation noise. Consequently, about 26% of the makeup of the
valuations comprise private information. If deemed a low number, it would align with Li and
Schuroff (2019)’s assertion that trading in the Municipal bonds market is driven primarily
by liquidity needs, not private information.
Does the transaction data reflect the theoretical equilibrium representation made by
Babus and Kondor (2018)? We see from figures 3.6 and 3.7 of section 3.4.4 that it does condi-
tonally with increasing centrality, in that the empirical components reflecting deviations from
equilibrium in these figures on average shrink towards zero as centrality increases. Fur-
thermore, we see various behaviors of strategic relevance for central and peripheral dealers,
which we are able to assign intuitive explanations that emanate from a dealer’s propensity
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to be strategic in the OTC marketplace. Finally, we see, more explicitly in section 3.4.5,
that central dealers, whether they are sellers or buyers, are more successful at achieving their
profit maximization goals by obtaining higher (when they’re sellers) or lower (when they’re
buyers) transaction prices at the expense of their counterparties.
While the characteristics of the system’s convergence to equilibrium is revealing, we
have also seen that the deviations from equilibrium correlate markedly with the inelasticity
of the exogenous customer demand. This observation could drive interesting future research,
in which finer-grained analyses of the now relatively monolithic empirical components that
characterize the system’s deviations from equilibrium would be conducted.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
Invoking the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula, which states that if B and D are
n x p matrices, A an n x n nonsingular matrix, and (I +DTA−1B)−1 exists, then:
(A+BDT )−1 = A−1 − A−1B(I +DTA−1B)−1DTA−1
See Meyer (2000, p. 125) for a statement of the above formula. Let p = n and D be the n x n
identity matrix, then the above formula reduces to (A+B)−1 = A−1−A−1B(I+A−1B)−1A−1.
And the condition for A+B to be nonsingular becomes that (I+A−1B) must be nonsingular,
which in turn means that none of the eigenvalues of the product A−1B, call them λ(A−1B)i,
must be identically equal to -1. Now, let A = (I + (−z̄l)) and B = (−z̄r), so that equation
(1.8) becomes U = A+B.
Then, to prove that U is nonsingular, we need to show that (a) A = (I+(−z̄l)) is nonsingular,
and (b) λ(A−1B)i 6= −1 for i ∈ {1, .., n}. For the condition in (b), whenever λ(A−1B)i = −1
for any i ∈ {1, .., n}, we can find an approximation, B′, in the neighborhood of B, defined
by B′ = B + δA, where δ is an arbitrary positive scalar, so that A−1B′ = A−1B + δI. This
means λ(A−1B′)i = λ(A
−1B)i+δ. Consequently, λ(A
−1B′)i = δ−1 for any λ(A−1B)i = −1.
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For each trader, i, to be in the network, he must have traded with at least one other trader
within the network, and that automatically means the price signals he carries must have
a positive weight, equal to 2τi, assigned to it by his trading counterparties within the net-
work, where τi ∈ (0, 1). Let τi’s in the network be bounded away from zero by κ, so that
0 < 2κ ≤ 2τ (1)i is the i − th non-zero off-diagonal element in A and 0 < 2κ ≤ 2τ
(2)
i is the
i− th non-zero off-diagonal element in B. Then, if there are h non-zero off-diagonal elements
































Hence, δ must exist such that δ[n + h
2
22]  (2κ)2 h
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. In which case,
||δA||F  ||B||F and ||B′||F → ||B||F . This way, our solution is the exact solution to a
nearby problem (see Meyer (2000, p. 347 - 349) for motivation of this idea in the context of
Numerical Stability).
Now we turn attention to showing that A = (I + (−z̄l)) is nonsingular. To do so, the follow-
ing well-known polynomial factorization is used:
(I +N)(I −N +N2 −N3 + ...+ (−1)n−1Nn−1) = (I + (−1)n−1Nn) = I
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Where the matrix N is nilpotent with index less or equal to n and so Nn is zero (see Meyer
(2000, p. 574)). From the above polynomial factorization, we obtain a formula for the in-
verse, as follows:




The matrix −z̄l is nilpotent with index less or equal to n, because it is lower-triangular with
only zeros on its diagonal. Set N = −z̄l to complete the proof.
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Code
.0.1 Script for preprocessing the data to feed the C++ program
#!/bin/bash -fx
if [ $# -lt 2 ]; then
echo "Usage: <inputData > <outputFile >"
exit 1
fi
awk -F"|" ’BEGIN{nm [""]=""; cnt =0}{if(NR==1) printf ("%s|%s|%s|%s
|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s\n",$1,$2,$5,$6,$9,$10 ,$12 ,$13 ,$21 ,$22);
else { if($12 >= 50000 && $13 > 1) { if($21 !˜ /ˆ[ ]*$/ && $21
!= "" && !($21 in nm)) {cnt = cnt + 1; nm[$21] = cnt} if($22
!˜ /ˆ[ ]*$/ && $22 != "" && !($22 in nm)) {cnt = cnt + 1; nm[
$22] = cnt} if( $21 !˜ /ˆ[ ]*$/ && $21 != "" && $22 !˜ /ˆ[ ]*$
/ && $22 != "" && $1 != "D" ) $1 = "D"; else if( $21 !˜ /ˆ[ ]*
$/ && $21 != "" && ($22 ˜ /ˆ[ ]*$/ || $22 == "") && $1 != "P"
) $1 = "P"; else if( $22 !˜ /ˆ[ ]*$/ && $22 != "" && ($21 ˜
/ˆ[ ]*$/ || $21 == "") && $1 != "S" ) $1 = "S"; if($21 ˜ /ˆ[
]*$/ || $21 == "") n21 = ""; else n21 = nm[$21]; if($22 ˜ /ˆ[
]*$/ || $22 == "") n22 = ""; else n22 = nm[$22]; printf ("%s|%s
|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s\n",$1,$2,$5,$6,$9,$10 ,$12 ,$13 ,n21 ,n22
)} }}’ $1 > cleaned.dat
82
awk -F"|" ’($1=="D" && $7 >= 1000000) || NR==1{ print $0}’
cleaned.dat > inter_1MM.dat
awk -F"|" ’{if(NR==1) printf (" TradeInd|CusID|Qty|Px|Buy -side|
Sell -side\n"); else { cInd=$2 "_" $5; printf ("%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%
s\n",$1,cInd ,$7,$8,$9,$10)}}’ inter_1MM.dat > interSelect_1MM
.dat
awk ’BEGIN{FS="|"; OFS ="|"; ar [""]=""; cnt=0}NR==1{ print $0}NR >1{
if(!($5 in ar)) {cnt = cnt + 1; ar[$5]=cnt} if(!($6 in ar)) {
cnt = cnt + 1; ar[$6]=cnt} $5=ar[$5]; $6=ar[$6]; print $0}’
interSelect_1MM.dat > interRemap_1MM.dat
awk ’BEGIN{mrg [""]=""; FS=OFS ="|"}NR==0{ print $0}NR >1{a=$2 "-" $4
"-" $5 "-" $6; if(a in mrg) mrg[a] = mrg[a] + $3; else mrg[a]
= $3}END{for(i in mrg) if(i!="") {split(i,ar ,"-"); printf ("D
|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s\n",ar[1],mrg[i],ar[2],ar[3],ar[4])}}’
interRemap_1MM.dat > $2
.0.2 C++ code for generating Sparse matrix structure and build-

























map <int , vector <int > > id_mp , id_b , id_s;
map <int , double > id_px , id_qt;
map <int , int > sec_id , mb_d , ms_d;
int cus_id = 0, qq = 0;
map <string , int > cid;
map <int , set <int > > r_c , r_cc;
vector <double > vp, vq;
char le [2048];
_fi.getline(le, 2048); // header row...
while(_fi.getline(le, 2048))
{





short b_d , s_d;
pt = strtok(nullptr , "|");
assert(pt);








id_mp[ cid[cus] ]. push_back(qq);
pt = strtok(nullptr , "|");
assert(pt);
q = atof(pt);
pt = strtok(nullptr , "|");
assert(pt);
p = atof(pt);
pt = strtok(nullptr , "|");
assert(pt);
b_d = atoi(pt);







r_c[b_d] = set <int >();










int I = qq, I_S = id_mp.size();
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_fi.close();
// Construct u(A), v(A)
int ct = 1, N = r_c.size();
vector <int > u_A(N+1,0), uc_A(N+1,0), v_A , vc_A;
vector <double > w_A;
map <int , map <int , int > > spIdx , btIdx;
int T = N;
for(auto& mt : r_c)
{
int r = mt.first , sz = mt.second.size(); //r is
dealer_id , corresponds to row# = dealer_id
-1...
for(int q = ct+1; q < r; ++q)
u_A[q] = u_A[q-1];
u_A[r] = u_A[r-1] + sz;
ct = r;






int I_Z = v_A.size();
ct = 1;
for(auto& mt : r_cc)
{
int r = mt.first , sz = mt.second.size(); //r is
dealer_id , corresponds to row# = dealer_id
-1...
for(int q = ct+1; q < r; ++q)
uc_A[q] = uc_A[q-1];
uc_A[r] = uc_A[r-1] + sz;
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ct = r;






int I_b = vc_A.size();
int qqq = 1, qqu = 1, qqt = 1, pid = 0, uniq = 0;
map <int , vector <int > > idx_Z , s_id , u_dlr_mp;
for(int i = 1; i <= 6; ++i)
idx_Z[i] = vector <int >();
for(int i = 1; i <= 5; ++i)
s_id[i] = vector <int >();
for(int i = 1; i <= 2; ++i)
u_dlr_mp[i] = vector <int >();
























map <int , vector <int > > dp;
set <int > uq;
for(auto& vt : mt.second)
{





int cnt = 1;
map <int , int > zmp;
for(auto& st : uq)
{






for(auto& vt : mt.second)
{
int idx1 = spIdx[mb_d[vt] ][ms_d[vt] ],
idx2 = spIdx[ms_d[vt] ][mb_d[vt] ];
idx_Z [1]. push_back(idx1);
idx_Z [2]. push_back(idx2);
idx_Z [3]. push_back(zmp[mb_d[vt] ]);
idx_Z [4]. push_back(zmp[ms_d[vt] ]);





for(auto& bt : dp)
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{










int U_D_S = qqt;
//write out data file
ofstream _ot(argv [2]);
_ot <<"I <- "<<I<<"\n";
_ot <<"T <- "<<T<<"\n";
_ot <<"I_Z <- "<<I_Z <<"\n";
_ot <<"I_S <- "<<I_S <<"\n";
_ot <<"I_b <- "<<I_b <<"\n";
_ot <<"U_D_S <- "<<U_D_S <<"\n";
for(int i = 0; i < vp.size(); ++i)
{
if(i == 0)





for(int i = 0; i < vq.size(); ++i)
{
if(i == 0)






for(int i = 1; i <= 6; ++i)
{
int sz = idx_Z [1]. size();
assert(sz == I);
for(int j = 0; j < sz; ++j)
{
if(i == 1 && j == 0)






_ot <<"), .Dim = c("<<I<<",6))\n";
for(int i = 1; i <= 5; ++i)
{
int sz = s_id [1]. size();
assert(sz == I_S);
for(int j = 0; j < sz; ++j)
{
if(i == 1 && j == 0)






_ot <<"), .Dim = c("<<I_S <<",5))\n";
for(int i = 1; i <= 2; ++i)
{
int sz = u_dlr_mp [1]. size();
assert(sz == U_D_S);
for(int j = 0; j < sz; ++j)
{
if(i == 1 && j == 0)
90










.0.3 Stan program implementing the hierarchical probability model
data {
int T; //count of distinct
dealers
int I_Z; //count of distinct
dealer connections (count of non -zero entries in info -
assymetry matrix)
int I_S; //count of unique
Securities
int I_b; //count of unique Buys
int I; //count of total trade
records
int U_D_S; // unique dealer ID per
traded Security
int idx_Z[I, 6]; // location in vector U of
trade record i’s buy -dealer ’s info -assymetry
parameter , uniq buy/sell id’s, uniq Beta loc
int s_id[I_S , 5]; //start and end points
for each security ’s corresponding trade records [1,2],
and uniq dlrs for Security [4,5]
int u_dlr_mp[U_D_S , 2]; //map of dlr id to uniq





























vector <lower=0, upper=2>[I_Z] z;
vector <lower=0>[I_b] beta; //this is the






















vector[I_S] mn_th; // Global
vector[I_S] s_a;
vector[I_S] intp;
real <lower=0, upper=1> rho; // Global
real <lower=0> sig; // Global





a1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
a2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
d1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
d2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
e1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
e2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
w1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
w2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
tau1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
tau2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
th1 ˜ normal (0,2);
th2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
sd1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
sd2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
sth1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
sth2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
om1 ˜ gamma (1,1);
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om2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
op2 ˜ gamma (1,1);
op1 ˜ normal(0, 2);
intp_m ˜ normal(op1 , op2);
intp_s ˜ gamma(om1 , om2);
intp ˜ normal(intp_m , intp_s);
v ˜ gamma(d1, d2);
g ˜ gamma(e1, e2);
beta ˜ gamma(v, g);
psi ˜ gamma(w1, w2);
gam ˜ gamma(tau1 , tau2);
y ˜ gamma(a1, a2);
rho ˜ normal (0.5, 1);
sig ˜ gamma(sd1 , sd2);
sig_th ˜ gamma(sth1 , sth2);




n_rhs = sqrt(1 - rho);
eta ˜ normal(0, n_rhs*sig);
eps ˜ normal(0, sig_th*sig);
z ˜ normal (1,1);
l1 ˜ normal(0, 2);
l2 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
m1 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
m2 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
f1 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
f2 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
h1 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
h2 ˜ gamma(1, 1);
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mu ˜ normal(l1, l2);
lambda ˜ gamma(m1, m2);
alpha_1 ˜ gamma(f1, f2);
alpha_2 ˜ gamma(h1, h2);
del_p ˜ normal(mu, lambda);
del_beta ˜ gamma(alpha_1 , alpha_2);
for (s in 1:I_S)
{
s_a[s] ˜ normal(mn_th[s], rhs*sig); //this is
Theta_hat , the common value across traders
for a given security
int bg = s_id[s,1];
int ed = s_id[s,2];
int uq = s_id[s,3];
int bg_u = s_id[s,4];







int dlr_id = u_dlr_mp[bg_u -1+k, 1];
int dlr_uq = u_dlr_mp[bg_u -1+k, 2];
if(k != dlr_uq)
print(" Unique ID breach for
Security: ",s ," at counter k
=",k ," and dlr uq of: ",
dlr_uq);
y_[k] = y[dlr_id ];











for (l in bg:ed)
{
int i = idx_Z[l,3];
int j = idx_Z[l,4];
real z_i = z[ idx_Z[l,1] ];
real z_j = z[ idx_Z[l,2] ];
u[i, j] = z_i;
u[j, i] = z_j;
}
// Compute Equilibrium y and z
for(k in 1:uq)
{








sm = 1 - sm;
for(l in 1:uq)
{
if(k != l && u[k,l] != 0)
{












e_ = u \ w;
for(q in 1:uq)
ee[bg_u -1+q] ˜ normal(e_[q], 0.05);
for (l in bg:ed)
{
int i = idx_Z[l,3];
int j = idx_Z[l,4];
int b = idx_Z[l,5];
int q = idx_Z[l,6];
real z_i = z[ idx_Z[l,1] ];
real z_j = z[ idx_Z[l,2] ];
px[q]/100.0 ˜ normal( intp[s] + del_p[q]
+ ( (2 - z_j)*ee[bg_u -1+i] + (2 - z_i)
*ee[bg_u -1+j] ) / (4 - z_i*z_j) , psi[
s] );
qt[q] ˜ normal( (intp[s] + del_p[q])*
del_beta[q] + beta[b]*(2 - z_j)*( (2 +
z_j - z_i*z_j)*ee[bg_u -1+i] - (2 -
z_i)*ee[bg_u -1+j] )/( (4 - z_i*z_j)*(










for (s in 1:I_S)
{
int bg = s_id[s,1];
int ed = s_id[s,2];
int uq = s_id[s,3];
int bg_u = s_id[s,4];
int ed_u = s_id[s,5];
for (l in bg:ed)
{
int i = idx_Z[l,3];
int j = idx_Z[l,4];
int b = idx_Z[l,5];
int q = idx_Z[l,6];
real z_i = z[ idx_Z[l,1] ];
real z_j = z[ idx_Z[l,2] ];
px_new[q] = intp[s] + del_p[q] + ( (2 -
z_j)*ee[bg_u -1+i] + (2 - z_i)*ee[bg_u
-1+j] ) / (4 - z_i*z_j);
qt_new[q] = (intp[s] + del_p[q])*del_beta
[q] + beta[b]*(2 - z_j)*( (2 + z_j -
z_i*z_j)*ee[bg_u -1+i] - (2 - z_i)*ee[






px_err[h] = px[h]/100.0 - px_new[h];
qt_err[h] = qt[h] - qt_new[h];
}
}




## Running 4 chains of the model ###
####################################
nohup msrb_NEW_9b sample num_samples =100 num_warmup =1000 adapt
delta =0.99 algorithm=hmc stepsize =0.2 random seed =12345 data
file=data/stan_dataFile_1MM.dat output file=output/
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .1.csv refresh =20 > logs/log.
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .1 2>&1 < /dev/null &
nohup msrb_NEW_9b sample num_samples =100 num_warmup =1000 adapt
delta =0.99 algorithm=hmc stepsize =0.2 random seed =1234 data
file=data/stan_dataFile_1MM.dat output file=output/
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .2.csv refresh =20 > logs/log.
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .2 2>&1 < /dev/null &
nohup msrb_NEW_9b sample num_samples =100 num_warmup =1000 adapt
delta =0.99 algorithm=hmc stepsize =0.2 random seed =123 data
file=data/stan_dataFile_1MM.dat output file=output/
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .3.csv refresh =20 > logs/log.
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .3 2>&1 < /dev/null &
nohup msrb_NEW_9b sample num_samples =100 num_warmup =1000 adapt
delta =0.99 algorithm=hmc stepsize =0.2 random seed =12 data file
=data/stan_dataFile_1MM.dat output file=output/
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .4.csv refresh =20 > logs/log.
msrb_NEW_9b_1MM_1K .4 2>&1 < /dev/null &
.0.5 Aggregation bins for Model-calculated Trade Price and Quan-
tities
The following aggregation bins follow the coding format required




mutate(PxBin = case_when(Px > 1.57 ˜ 1.59,
Px > 1.55 ˜ 1.56,
Px > 1.53 ˜ 1.54,
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Px > 1.51 ˜ 1.52,
Px > 1.49 ˜ 1.5,
Px > 1.47 ˜ 1.48,
Px > 1.45 ˜ 1.46,
Px > 1.43 ˜ 1.44,
Px > 1.41 ˜ 1.42,
Px > 1.39 ˜ 1.4,
Px > 1.37 ˜ 1.38,
Px > 1.35 ˜ 1.36,
Px > 1.33 ˜ 1.34,
Px > 1.31 ˜ 1.32,
Px > 1.29 ˜ 1.3,
Px > 1.27 ˜ 1.28,
Px > 1.25 ˜ 1.26,
Px > 1.23 ˜ 1.24,
Px > 1.21 ˜ 1.22,
Px > 1.19 ˜ 1.2,
Px > 1.17 ˜ 1.18,
Px > 1.15 ˜ 1.16,
Px > 1.13 ˜ 1.14,
Px > 1.11 ˜ 1.12,
Px > 1.09 ˜ 1.1,
Px > 1.07 ˜ 1.08,
Px > 1.05 ˜ 1.06,
Px > 1.03 ˜ 1.04,
Px > 1.01 ˜ 1.02,
Px > 0.99 ˜ 1,
Px > 0.97 ˜ 0.98,
Px > 0.95 ˜ 0.96,
Px > 0.93 ˜ 0.94,
Px > 0.91 ˜ 0.92,
Px > 0.89 ˜ 0.9,
Px > 0.87 ˜ 0.88,
Px > 0.85 ˜ 0.86,
Px > 0.83 ˜ 0.84,
Px > 0.81 ˜ 0.82,
Px > 0.79 ˜ 0.8,
Px > 0.77 ˜ 0.78,
Px > 0.75 ˜ 0.76,
Px > 0.73 ˜ 0.74,
Px > 0.71 ˜ 0.72,
Px > 0.69 ˜ 0.7,
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Px > 0.67 ˜ 0.68,
Px > 0.65 ˜ 0.66,
Px > 0.63 ˜ 0.64,
Px > 0.61 ˜ 0.62,
Px > 0.59 ˜ 0.6,
Px > 0.57 ˜ 0.58,
Px > 0.55 ˜ 0.56,
Px > 0.53 ˜ 0.54,
Px > 0.51 ˜ 0.52,
Px > 0.49 ˜ 0.5,
Px > 0.47 ˜ 0.48,
Px > 0.45 ˜ 0.46,
Px > 0.43 ˜ 0.44,
Px > 0.41 ˜ 0.42,
Px > 0.39 ˜ 0.4,
Px > 0.37 ˜ 0.38,
Px > 0.35 ˜ 0.36,
Px > 0.33 ˜ 0.34,
Px > 0.31 ˜ 0.32,
Px > 0.29 ˜ 0.3,
Px > 0.27 ˜ 0.28,
Px > 0.25 ˜ 0.26,
Px > 0.23 ˜ 0.24,
Px > 0.21 ˜ 0.22,
Px > 0.19 ˜ 0.2,
Px > 0.17 ˜ 0.18,
Px > 0.15 ˜ 0.16,
Px > 0.13 ˜ 0.14,
Px > 0.11 ˜ 0.12,
Px > 0.09 ˜ 0.1,
Px > 0.07 ˜ 0.08,
Px > 0.05 ˜ 0.06,
Px > 0.03 ˜ 0.04,




mutate(QtBin = case_when(Qt < 1.5 ˜ 1,
Qt < 2 ˜ 1.5,
Qt < 2.5 ˜ 2,
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Qt < 3 ˜ 2.5,
Qt < 3.5 ˜ 3,
Qt < 4 ˜ 3.5,
Qt < 4.5 ˜ 4,
Qt < 5 ˜ 4.5,
Qt < 5.5 ˜ 5,
Qt < 6 ˜ 5.5,
Qt < 6.5 ˜ 6,
Qt < 7 ˜ 6.5,
Qt < 7.5 ˜ 7,
Qt < 8 ˜ 7.5,
Qt < 8.5 ˜ 8,
Qt < 9 ˜ 8.5,
Qt < 9.5 ˜ 9,
Qt < 10 ˜ 9.5,
Qt < 11 ˜ 10.5,
Qt < 12 ˜ 11.5,
Qt < 13 ˜ 12.5,
Qt < 14 ˜ 13.5,
Qt < 15 ˜ 14.5,
Qt < 16 ˜ 15.5,
Qt < 18 ˜ 17,
Qt < 20 ˜ 19,
Qt < 25 ˜ 22.5,
Qt < 30 ˜ 27.5,
Qt < 40 ˜ 35,
Qt < 50 ˜ 45,
Qt < 75 ˜ 63,
Qt < 100 ˜ 88,
Qt < 200 ˜ 150,
Qt < 300 ˜ 250,
Qt < 400 ˜ 350,
TRUE ˜ 500 ))
















SellDlrSig "," SigWgt_SellDlr ","Z_WgtS","BuyEqSig","SellEqSig","
SecMeanVal "," SecCmonVal ","SecIntp","Del_P","Del_Beta","Beta")
r1$Xs_P = r1$Del_P + r1$SecIntp
r1$Del_Q = r1$Del_Beta * r1$Xs_P
d1=read.table("C:/ cygwin64/home/hbeeside/msrb/data/interAgg_1MM.
dat",sep="|", header=F, as.is=T)
names(d1)=c("Side", "ID", "Qty", "Px","Buy","Sell")
#fn = paste(pDr ," PxQt_Distrn.pdf",sep ="")
fn = paste(pDr ," Px_Distrn.pdf",sep ="")
pdf(fn)
#par(mfrow=c(2,1), mar=c(3,3,1,1), oma=c(0,0,2,0), #mgp=c
(1.3 ,0.5 ,0))
ggplot(d1, aes(x=Px)) + geom_density(fill = "white", colour=’blue
’, size = 0.6) + geom_vline(aes(xintercept = mean(Px)), colour
=’red ’, linetype = "dashed", size = 0.6, fill="white") +
theme_bw () + labs(title = "Frequency Density of Price", x = "




fn = paste(pDr ," Qt_Distrn.pdf",sep ="")
pdf(fn)
ggplot(d1, aes(x=log(Qty/1e6))) + geom_density(fill = "white",
colour=’blue ’, size = 0.6) + geom_vline(aes(xintercept = mean(
log(Qty/1e6))), colour=’red ’, linetype = "dashed", size = 0.6,
fill="white") + theme_bw () + labs(title = "Frequency Density
of Log (Traded Par Amount in Million Dollar Units)", x = "Log
(Traded Par Amount in $Million)", y = "Frequency Density ") +
theme(plot.title = element_text(hjust = 0.5))
dev.off()
r1_P = r1 %>%
mutate(PxBin = case_when(Px > 1.57 ˜ 1.59,
Px > 1.55 ˜ 1.56,
Px > 1.53 ˜ 1.54,
Px > 1.51 ˜ 1.52,
Px > 1.49 ˜ 1.5,
Px > 1.47 ˜ 1.48,
Px > 1.45 ˜ 1.46,
Px > 1.43 ˜ 1.44,
Px > 1.41 ˜ 1.42,
Px > 1.39 ˜ 1.4,
Px > 1.37 ˜ 1.38,
Px > 1.35 ˜ 1.36,
Px > 1.33 ˜ 1.34,
Px > 1.31 ˜ 1.32,
Px > 1.29 ˜ 1.3,
Px > 1.27 ˜ 1.28,
Px > 1.25 ˜ 1.26,
Px > 1.23 ˜ 1.24,
Px > 1.21 ˜ 1.22,
Px > 1.19 ˜ 1.2,
Px > 1.17 ˜ 1.18,
Px > 1.15 ˜ 1.16,
Px > 1.13 ˜ 1.14,
Px > 1.11 ˜ 1.12,
Px > 1.09 ˜ 1.1,
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Px > 1.07 ˜ 1.08,
Px > 1.05 ˜ 1.06,
Px > 1.03 ˜ 1.04,
Px > 1.01 ˜ 1.02,
Px > 0.99 ˜ 1,
Px > 0.97 ˜ 0.98,
Px > 0.95 ˜ 0.96,
Px > 0.93 ˜ 0.94,
Px > 0.91 ˜ 0.92,
Px > 0.89 ˜ 0.9,
Px > 0.87 ˜ 0.88,
Px > 0.85 ˜ 0.86,
Px > 0.83 ˜ 0.84,
Px > 0.81 ˜ 0.82,
Px > 0.79 ˜ 0.8,
Px > 0.77 ˜ 0.78,
Px > 0.75 ˜ 0.76,
Px > 0.73 ˜ 0.74,
Px > 0.71 ˜ 0.72,
Px > 0.69 ˜ 0.7,
Px > 0.67 ˜ 0.68,
Px > 0.65 ˜ 0.66,
Px > 0.63 ˜ 0.64,
Px > 0.61 ˜ 0.62,
Px > 0.59 ˜ 0.6,
Px > 0.57 ˜ 0.58,
Px > 0.55 ˜ 0.56,
Px > 0.53 ˜ 0.54,
Px > 0.51 ˜ 0.52,
Px > 0.49 ˜ 0.5,
Px > 0.47 ˜ 0.48,
Px > 0.45 ˜ 0.46,
Px > 0.43 ˜ 0.44,
Px > 0.41 ˜ 0.42,
Px > 0.39 ˜ 0.4,
Px > 0.37 ˜ 0.38,
Px > 0.35 ˜ 0.36,
Px > 0.33 ˜ 0.34,
Px > 0.31 ˜ 0.32,
Px > 0.29 ˜ 0.3,
Px > 0.27 ˜ 0.28,
Px > 0.25 ˜ 0.26,
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Px > 0.23 ˜ 0.24,
Px > 0.21 ˜ 0.22,
Px > 0.19 ˜ 0.2,
Px > 0.17 ˜ 0.18,
Px > 0.15 ˜ 0.16,
Px > 0.13 ˜ 0.14,
Px > 0.11 ˜ 0.12,
Px > 0.09 ˜ 0.1,
Px > 0.07 ˜ 0.08,
Px > 0.05 ˜ 0.06,
Px > 0.03 ˜ 0.04,
Px > 0.01 ˜ 0.02,
TRUE ˜ 0.005))
r1_gpPxBin = r1_P %>% group_by(PxBin) %>% summarise_at(vars(PxNew
, Px, QtNew , Qt, BuyEqSig , SellEqSig , SecMeanVal , SecCmonVal ,
BuyDlrSig , SigWgt_BuyDlr , Z_WgtB , SellDlrSig , SigWgt_SellDlr ,
Z_WgtS , SecIntp , Del_P , Del_Beta , Beta , Xs_P , Del_Q), list(mn=
mean , sd=sd))
sink(crFl) ## Start writing to file
pq = lm(PxNew ˜ QtNew , data = r1)
summary(pq)
cat ("1. Aggregate Level Analysis\n")
cat ("============================\n\n")
cat("1 (A) Grouping By Price Bins:\n")
cat("---------------------------\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , PredictedPrice) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$PxNew_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , PredictedQuantity) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$QtNew_mn)))
## SD within buckets for PxNew increases with PxNew and not too
## high relatively
########### EqSig AgPx ##################
########################################
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
########### EqCmonVals AgPx ##################
#############################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(r1_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradeQtyEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmPriceDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Xs_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmQtyDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_gpPxBin$Del_Q_mn)))
sink()
r1_Q = r1 %>%
mutate(QtBin = case_when(Qt < 1.5 ˜ 1,
Qt < 2 ˜ 1.5,
Qt < 2.5 ˜ 2,
Qt < 3 ˜ 2.5,
Qt < 3.5 ˜ 3,
Qt < 4 ˜ 3.5,
Qt < 4.5 ˜ 4,
Qt < 5 ˜ 4.5,
Qt < 5.5 ˜ 5,
Qt < 6 ˜ 5.5,
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Qt < 6.5 ˜ 6,
Qt < 7 ˜ 6.5,
Qt < 7.5 ˜ 7,
Qt < 8 ˜ 7.5,
Qt < 8.5 ˜ 8,
Qt < 9 ˜ 8.5,
Qt < 9.5 ˜ 9,
Qt < 10 ˜ 9.5,
Qt < 11 ˜ 10.5,
Qt < 12 ˜ 11.5,
Qt < 13 ˜ 12.5,
Qt < 14 ˜ 13.5,
Qt < 15 ˜ 14.5,
Qt < 16 ˜ 15.5,
Qt < 18 ˜ 17,
Qt < 20 ˜ 19,
Qt < 25 ˜ 22.5,
Qt < 30 ˜ 27.5,
Qt < 40 ˜ 35,
Qt < 50 ˜ 45,
Qt < 75 ˜ 63,
Qt < 100 ˜ 88,
Qt < 200 ˜ 150,
Qt < 300 ˜ 250,
Qt < 400 ˜ 350,
TRUE ˜ 500 ))
r1_gpQtBin = r1_Q %>% group_by(QtBin) %>% summarise_at(vars(PxNew
, Px, QtNew , Qt, BuyEqSig , SellEqSig , SecMeanVal , SecCmonVal ,
BuyDlrSig , SigWgt_BuyDlr , Z_WgtB , SellDlrSig , SigWgt_SellDlr ,
Z_WgtS , SecIntp , Del_P , Del_Beta , Beta , Xs_P , Del_Q), list(mn=
mean , sd=sd))
sink(crFl , append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
cat("\n\n\n")
cat("1 (B) Grouping By Par -Amount (Quantity) Bins:\n")
cat("--------------------------------------------\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , PredictedPrice) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$PxNew_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , PredictedQuantity) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$QtNew_mn)))
## SD within buckets for PxNew increases with PxNew and not too
## high relatively
########### EqSig AgPx ##################
########################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
########### EqCmonVals AgPx ##################
#############################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_P_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_gpQtBin$Px_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_gpQtBin$Qt_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(r1_gpQtBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpQtBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_gpQtBin$Del_P_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Del_P_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradeQtyEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Del_Beta_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmPriceDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_gpQtBin$Beta_mn , r1_gpQtBin$Xs_P_mn)))










## Write out Nodes and Edges for Pyvis to create Visualization
############################################
tA = unique(r1[,c(" BuyDlr", "SellDlr ")])
lA = tA
names(lA) = c("from","to")
lA = lA[order(lA$from , lA$to),]
write.csv(lA, "C:/Users/hbeeside/Desktop/Dissertation/PythonCode/
edges_9d_1MM.csv", row.names=FALSE)
b1 = data.frame(unique(r1[,"BuyDlr "]))











### The network and its Degree distribution ###
################################################
net <- graph_from_data_frame(d=lA, vertices=nA, directed=F)
dg_dist <- degree_distribution(net , cumulative=F, mode="all")
dg = degree(net , mode="all")
##############################################################
## Distribution of the theoretical (Random Poisson) network ##
##############################################################
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genProb <- function(d, n, p) {
lmb = (n-1)*p
lfact = lfactorial(d)






fn = paste(pDr ," DegDistrn.pdf",sep ="")
pdf(fn)
par(mfrow=c(2,1), mar=c(3,3,1,1), oma=c(0,0,2,0), mgp=c
(1.3 ,0.5 ,0))
plot(log(x), dg_dist [2: length(dg_dist)], col="blue", type="b",
xlab="Log Degree", ylab=" Probability of Degree", ylim=c(0,max(
dg_dist ,y)), pch=17, lty=1, lwd=2)
lines(log(x), y, col="red", type="b", pch=16, lty=3, lwd=2)
legend (" topright", c(" Trading Network", "Random Network "), col=c
("blue", "red"), pch=c(17 ,16), lty=c(1,3), lwd=c(2,2))
plot(log(x), log(dg_dist [2: length(dg_dist)]), col="blue", type="b
", xlab="Log Degree", ylab="Log Probability of Degree", ylim=c
(-20, 0), pch=17, lty=1, lwd=2)
lines(log(x), log(y), col="red", type="b", pch=16, lty=3, lwd=2)
legend (" topright", c(" Trading Network", "Random Network "), col=c
("blue", "red"), pch=c(17 ,16), lty=c(1,3), lwd=c(2,2))
mtext(" Degree Distributions for Theoretical Random Network
Compared to Trading Network", side=3, outer=TRUE , cex =0.9)
dev.off()
########################################################
## Create eigen centrality for Pyvis Visualization ##
########################################################
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ec=eigen_centrality(net , directed=F, weights=NA)
ec2=centr_eigen(net , directed=F, normalized=T)
n = length(nA)
e_nA=rep(NA,n)
for(i in 1:n) e_nA[i] = unlist(ec$vector [[i]])
summary(e_nA)
## Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.





























tmp = r1[r1$BuyDlr ==nrB[i,1],]
bVal[i] = nrB[i,1]
bSizeW[i] = dim(tmp)[1]
bVec[i] = tmp$Z_WgtB [1]
btVec[i] = tmp$Beta [1]











tmp = tA[tA$BuyDlr ==nrB[i,1],]
bSize[i]= dim(tmp)[1]
bCtr[i] = ec$vector [[ nrB[i,1] ]]
}
bDat2=data.frame(bVal ,bVec ,bSize ,bSizeW ,bMat ,pMat ,dbMat ,btVec ,
sgVec ,tpMat ,xpMat ,dqMat ,eqbMat ,eqsMat ,scMat ,smMat ,bCtr)
##b_Z: Z_WgtB; h_b: Z_WgtS; h_p: Del_P; h_db: Del_Beta; h_tp: ##
SecIntp; h_xp: Xs_P; h_dq: Del_Q; h_eqb: BuyEqSig; h_eqs: ##
SellEqSig; h_sc: SecCmonVal; h_sm: SecMeanVal
bDat=bDat2








r1_centByr = r1[( r1$BuyDlr %in% centByr),]




### Check Px-Qt characteristics: Supply -Demand curves ####
##########################################################
r1_P_centByr = r1_centByr %>%
mutate(PxBin = case_when(Px > 1.57 ˜ 1.59,
Px > 1.55 ˜ 1.56,
Px > 1.53 ˜ 1.54,
Px > 1.51 ˜ 1.52,
Px > 1.49 ˜ 1.5,
Px > 1.47 ˜ 1.48,
Px > 1.45 ˜ 1.46,
Px > 1.43 ˜ 1.44,
Px > 1.41 ˜ 1.42,
Px > 1.39 ˜ 1.4,
Px > 1.37 ˜ 1.38,
Px > 1.35 ˜ 1.36,
Px > 1.33 ˜ 1.34,
Px > 1.31 ˜ 1.32,
Px > 1.29 ˜ 1.3,
Px > 1.27 ˜ 1.28,
Px > 1.25 ˜ 1.26,
Px > 1.23 ˜ 1.24,
Px > 1.21 ˜ 1.22,
Px > 1.19 ˜ 1.2,
Px > 1.17 ˜ 1.18,
Px > 1.15 ˜ 1.16,
Px > 1.13 ˜ 1.14,
Px > 1.11 ˜ 1.12,
Px > 1.09 ˜ 1.1,
Px > 1.07 ˜ 1.08,
Px > 1.05 ˜ 1.06,
Px > 1.03 ˜ 1.04,
Px > 1.01 ˜ 1.02,
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Px > 0.99 ˜ 1,
Px > 0.97 ˜ 0.98,
Px > 0.95 ˜ 0.96,
Px > 0.93 ˜ 0.94,
Px > 0.91 ˜ 0.92,
Px > 0.89 ˜ 0.9,
Px > 0.87 ˜ 0.88,
Px > 0.85 ˜ 0.86,
Px > 0.83 ˜ 0.84,
Px > 0.81 ˜ 0.82,
Px > 0.79 ˜ 0.8,
Px > 0.77 ˜ 0.78,
Px > 0.75 ˜ 0.76,
Px > 0.73 ˜ 0.74,
Px > 0.71 ˜ 0.72,
Px > 0.69 ˜ 0.7,
Px > 0.67 ˜ 0.68,
Px > 0.65 ˜ 0.66,
Px > 0.63 ˜ 0.64,
Px > 0.61 ˜ 0.62,
Px > 0.59 ˜ 0.6,
Px > 0.57 ˜ 0.58,
Px > 0.55 ˜ 0.56,
Px > 0.53 ˜ 0.54,
Px > 0.51 ˜ 0.52,
Px > 0.49 ˜ 0.5,
Px > 0.47 ˜ 0.48,
Px > 0.45 ˜ 0.46,
Px > 0.43 ˜ 0.44,
Px > 0.41 ˜ 0.42,
Px > 0.39 ˜ 0.4,
Px > 0.37 ˜ 0.38,
Px > 0.35 ˜ 0.36,
Px > 0.33 ˜ 0.34,
Px > 0.31 ˜ 0.32,
Px > 0.29 ˜ 0.3,
Px > 0.27 ˜ 0.28,
Px > 0.25 ˜ 0.26,
Px > 0.23 ˜ 0.24,
Px > 0.21 ˜ 0.22,
Px > 0.19 ˜ 0.2,
Px > 0.17 ˜ 0.18,
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Px > 0.15 ˜ 0.16,
Px > 0.13 ˜ 0.14,
Px > 0.11 ˜ 0.12,
Px > 0.09 ˜ 0.1,
Px > 0.07 ˜ 0.08,
Px > 0.05 ˜ 0.06,
Px > 0.03 ˜ 0.04,
Px > 0.01 ˜ 0.02,
TRUE ˜ 0.005))
r1_centByr_gpPxBin = r1_P_centByr %>% group_by(PxBin) %>%
summarise_at(vars(PxNew , Px, QtNew , Qt, BuyEqSig , SellEqSig ,
SecMeanVal , SecCmonVal , BuyDlrSig , SigWgt_BuyDlr , Z_WgtB ,
SellDlrSig , SigWgt_SellDlr , Z_WgtS , SecIntp , Del_P , Del_Beta ,
Beta , Xs_P , Del_Q), list(mn=mean , sd=sd))
sink(crFl , append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
cat("\n\n\n")
cat ("2. Dealer Level Analysis\n")
cat ("============================\n\n")
cat("2 (A) Grouping By Buying Central -Dealer Price Bins:\n")
cat("--------------------------------------------\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , PredictedPrice) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$PxNew_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , PredictedQuantity) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$QtNew_mn))
)
## SD within buckets for PxNew increases with PxNew and not too
## high relatively
########### EqSig AgPx ##################
########################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
########### EqCmonVals AgPx ##################
#############################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn
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)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn
)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradeQtyEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmPriceDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Xs_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmQtyDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_centByr_gpPxBin$Del_Q_mn)))
sink()
r1_P_perphByr = r1_perphByr %>%
mutate(PxBin = case_when(Px > 1.57 ˜ 1.59,
Px > 1.55 ˜ 1.56,
Px > 1.53 ˜ 1.54,
Px > 1.51 ˜ 1.52,
Px > 1.49 ˜ 1.5,
Px > 1.47 ˜ 1.48,
Px > 1.45 ˜ 1.46,
Px > 1.43 ˜ 1.44,
Px > 1.41 ˜ 1.42,
Px > 1.39 ˜ 1.4,
Px > 1.37 ˜ 1.38,
Px > 1.35 ˜ 1.36,
Px > 1.33 ˜ 1.34,
Px > 1.31 ˜ 1.32,
Px > 1.29 ˜ 1.3,
Px > 1.27 ˜ 1.28,
Px > 1.25 ˜ 1.26,
Px > 1.23 ˜ 1.24,
Px > 1.21 ˜ 1.22,
Px > 1.19 ˜ 1.2,
Px > 1.17 ˜ 1.18,
124
Px > 1.15 ˜ 1.16,
Px > 1.13 ˜ 1.14,
Px > 1.11 ˜ 1.12,
Px > 1.09 ˜ 1.1,
Px > 1.07 ˜ 1.08,
Px > 1.05 ˜ 1.06,
Px > 1.03 ˜ 1.04,
Px > 1.01 ˜ 1.02,
Px > 0.99 ˜ 1,
Px > 0.97 ˜ 0.98,
Px > 0.95 ˜ 0.96,
Px > 0.93 ˜ 0.94,
Px > 0.91 ˜ 0.92,
Px > 0.89 ˜ 0.9,
Px > 0.87 ˜ 0.88,
Px > 0.85 ˜ 0.86,
Px > 0.83 ˜ 0.84,
Px > 0.81 ˜ 0.82,
Px > 0.79 ˜ 0.8,
Px > 0.77 ˜ 0.78,
Px > 0.75 ˜ 0.76,
Px > 0.73 ˜ 0.74,
Px > 0.71 ˜ 0.72,
Px > 0.69 ˜ 0.7,
Px > 0.67 ˜ 0.68,
Px > 0.65 ˜ 0.66,
Px > 0.63 ˜ 0.64,
Px > 0.61 ˜ 0.62,
Px > 0.59 ˜ 0.6,
Px > 0.57 ˜ 0.58,
Px > 0.55 ˜ 0.56,
Px > 0.53 ˜ 0.54,
Px > 0.51 ˜ 0.52,
Px > 0.49 ˜ 0.5,
Px > 0.47 ˜ 0.48,
Px > 0.45 ˜ 0.46,
Px > 0.43 ˜ 0.44,
Px > 0.41 ˜ 0.42,
Px > 0.39 ˜ 0.4,
Px > 0.37 ˜ 0.38,
Px > 0.35 ˜ 0.36,
Px > 0.33 ˜ 0.34,
125
Px > 0.31 ˜ 0.32,
Px > 0.29 ˜ 0.3,
Px > 0.27 ˜ 0.28,
Px > 0.25 ˜ 0.26,
Px > 0.23 ˜ 0.24,
Px > 0.21 ˜ 0.22,
Px > 0.19 ˜ 0.2,
Px > 0.17 ˜ 0.18,
Px > 0.15 ˜ 0.16,
Px > 0.13 ˜ 0.14,
Px > 0.11 ˜ 0.12,
Px > 0.09 ˜ 0.1,
Px > 0.07 ˜ 0.08,
Px > 0.05 ˜ 0.06,
Px > 0.03 ˜ 0.04,
Px > 0.01 ˜ 0.02,
TRUE ˜ 0.005))
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin = r1_P_perphByr %>% group_by(PxBin) %>%
summarise_at(vars(PxNew , Px, QtNew , Qt, BuyEqSig , SellEqSig ,
SecMeanVal , SecCmonVal , BuyDlrSig , SigWgt_BuyDlr , Z_WgtB ,
SellDlrSig , SigWgt_SellDlr , Z_WgtS , SecIntp , Del_P , Del_Beta ,
Beta , Xs_P , Del_Q), list(mn=mean , sd=sd))
sink(crFl , append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
cat("\n\n\n")
cat("2 (B) Grouping By Buying Peripheral -Dealer Price Bins:\n")
cat("--------------------------------------------\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , PredictedPrice) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$PxNew_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , PredictedQuantity) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$QtNew_mn
)))
## SD within buckets for PxNew increases with PxNew and not too
## high relatively
########### EqSig AgPx ##################
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########################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
########### EqCmonVals AgPx #################
#############################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn))
)




cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradeQtyEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn ,
r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmPriceDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_perphByr_gpPxBin$Xs_P_mn))
)






























tmp = r1[r1$SellDlr ==nrS[i,1],]
sVal[i] = nrS[i,1]
sSizeW[i] = dim(tmp)[1]
sVec[i] = tmp$Z_WgtS [1]
btVecS[i] = tmp$Beta [1]











tmp = tA[tA$SellDlr ==nrS[i,1],]
sSize[i]= dim(tmp)[1]
sCtr[i] = ec$vector [[ nrS[i,1] ]]
}
sDat2=data.frame(sVal ,sVec ,sSize ,sSizeW ,sMat ,pMatS ,dbMatS ,btVecS ,












r1_centSlr = r1[( r1$SellDlr %in% centSlr),]
r1_perphSlr = r1[( r1$SellDlr %in% perphSlr) ,]
r1_P_centSlr = r1_centSlr %>%
mutate(PxBin = case_when(Px > 1.57 ˜ 1.59,
Px > 1.55 ˜ 1.56,
Px > 1.53 ˜ 1.54,
Px > 1.51 ˜ 1.52,
Px > 1.49 ˜ 1.5,
Px > 1.47 ˜ 1.48,
Px > 1.45 ˜ 1.46,
Px > 1.43 ˜ 1.44,
Px > 1.41 ˜ 1.42,
Px > 1.39 ˜ 1.4,
Px > 1.37 ˜ 1.38,
Px > 1.35 ˜ 1.36,
Px > 1.33 ˜ 1.34,
Px > 1.31 ˜ 1.32,
Px > 1.29 ˜ 1.3,
Px > 1.27 ˜ 1.28,
Px > 1.25 ˜ 1.26,
Px > 1.23 ˜ 1.24,
Px > 1.21 ˜ 1.22,
Px > 1.19 ˜ 1.2,
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Px > 1.17 ˜ 1.18,
Px > 1.15 ˜ 1.16,
Px > 1.13 ˜ 1.14,
Px > 1.11 ˜ 1.12,
Px > 1.09 ˜ 1.1,
Px > 1.07 ˜ 1.08,
Px > 1.05 ˜ 1.06,
Px > 1.03 ˜ 1.04,
Px > 1.01 ˜ 1.02,
Px > 0.99 ˜ 1,
Px > 0.97 ˜ 0.98,
Px > 0.95 ˜ 0.96,
Px > 0.93 ˜ 0.94,
Px > 0.91 ˜ 0.92,
Px > 0.89 ˜ 0.9,
Px > 0.87 ˜ 0.88,
Px > 0.85 ˜ 0.86,
Px > 0.83 ˜ 0.84,
Px > 0.81 ˜ 0.82,
Px > 0.79 ˜ 0.8,
Px > 0.77 ˜ 0.78,
Px > 0.75 ˜ 0.76,
Px > 0.73 ˜ 0.74,
Px > 0.71 ˜ 0.72,
Px > 0.69 ˜ 0.7,
Px > 0.67 ˜ 0.68,
Px > 0.65 ˜ 0.66,
Px > 0.63 ˜ 0.64,
Px > 0.61 ˜ 0.62,
Px > 0.59 ˜ 0.6,
Px > 0.57 ˜ 0.58,
Px > 0.55 ˜ 0.56,
Px > 0.53 ˜ 0.54,
Px > 0.51 ˜ 0.52,
Px > 0.49 ˜ 0.5,
Px > 0.47 ˜ 0.48,
Px > 0.45 ˜ 0.46,
Px > 0.43 ˜ 0.44,
Px > 0.41 ˜ 0.42,
Px > 0.39 ˜ 0.4,
Px > 0.37 ˜ 0.38,
Px > 0.35 ˜ 0.36,
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Px > 0.33 ˜ 0.34,
Px > 0.31 ˜ 0.32,
Px > 0.29 ˜ 0.3,
Px > 0.27 ˜ 0.28,
Px > 0.25 ˜ 0.26,
Px > 0.23 ˜ 0.24,
Px > 0.21 ˜ 0.22,
Px > 0.19 ˜ 0.2,
Px > 0.17 ˜ 0.18,
Px > 0.15 ˜ 0.16,
Px > 0.13 ˜ 0.14,
Px > 0.11 ˜ 0.12,
Px > 0.09 ˜ 0.1,
Px > 0.07 ˜ 0.08,
Px > 0.05 ˜ 0.06,
Px > 0.03 ˜ 0.04,
Px > 0.01 ˜ 0.02,
TRUE ˜ 0.005))
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin = r1_P_centSlr %>% group_by(PxBin) %>%
summarise_at(vars(PxNew , Px, QtNew , Qt, BuyEqSig , SellEqSig ,
SecMeanVal , SecCmonVal , BuyDlrSig , SigWgt_BuyDlr , Z_WgtB ,
SellDlrSig , SigWgt_SellDlr , Z_WgtS , SecIntp , Del_P , Del_Beta ,
Beta , Xs_P , Del_Q), list(mn=mean , sd=sd))
sink(crFl , append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
cat("\n\n\n")
cat("2 (E) Grouping By Selling Central -Dealer Price Bins:\n")
cat("----------------------------------------------------\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , PredictedPrice) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$PxNew_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , PredictedQuantity) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$QtNew_mn))
)
## SD within buckets for PxNew increases with PxNew and not too
## high relatively
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########### EqSig AgPx ##################
########################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
########### EqCmonVals AgPx ##################
#############################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)
))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn ,
r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradeQtyEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmPriceDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Xs_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmQtyDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_centSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Q_mn)))
sink()
r1_P_perphSlr = r1_perphSlr %>%
mutate(PxBin = case_when(Px > 1.57 ˜ 1.59,
Px > 1.55 ˜ 1.56,
Px > 1.53 ˜ 1.54,
Px > 1.51 ˜ 1.52,
Px > 1.49 ˜ 1.5,
Px > 1.47 ˜ 1.48,
Px > 1.45 ˜ 1.46,
Px > 1.43 ˜ 1.44,
Px > 1.41 ˜ 1.42,
Px > 1.39 ˜ 1.4,
Px > 1.37 ˜ 1.38,
Px > 1.35 ˜ 1.36,
Px > 1.33 ˜ 1.34,
Px > 1.31 ˜ 1.32,
Px > 1.29 ˜ 1.3,
Px > 1.27 ˜ 1.28,
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Px > 1.25 ˜ 1.26,
Px > 1.23 ˜ 1.24,
Px > 1.21 ˜ 1.22,
Px > 1.19 ˜ 1.2,
Px > 1.17 ˜ 1.18,
Px > 1.15 ˜ 1.16,
Px > 1.13 ˜ 1.14,
Px > 1.11 ˜ 1.12,
Px > 1.09 ˜ 1.1,
Px > 1.07 ˜ 1.08,
Px > 1.05 ˜ 1.06,
Px > 1.03 ˜ 1.04,
Px > 1.01 ˜ 1.02,
Px > 0.99 ˜ 1,
Px > 0.97 ˜ 0.98,
Px > 0.95 ˜ 0.96,
Px > 0.93 ˜ 0.94,
Px > 0.91 ˜ 0.92,
Px > 0.89 ˜ 0.9,
Px > 0.87 ˜ 0.88,
Px > 0.85 ˜ 0.86,
Px > 0.83 ˜ 0.84,
Px > 0.81 ˜ 0.82,
Px > 0.79 ˜ 0.8,
Px > 0.77 ˜ 0.78,
Px > 0.75 ˜ 0.76,
Px > 0.73 ˜ 0.74,
Px > 0.71 ˜ 0.72,
Px > 0.69 ˜ 0.7,
Px > 0.67 ˜ 0.68,
Px > 0.65 ˜ 0.66,
Px > 0.63 ˜ 0.64,
Px > 0.61 ˜ 0.62,
Px > 0.59 ˜ 0.6,
Px > 0.57 ˜ 0.58,
Px > 0.55 ˜ 0.56,
Px > 0.53 ˜ 0.54,
Px > 0.51 ˜ 0.52,
Px > 0.49 ˜ 0.5,
Px > 0.47 ˜ 0.48,
Px > 0.45 ˜ 0.46,
Px > 0.43 ˜ 0.44,
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Px > 0.41 ˜ 0.42,
Px > 0.39 ˜ 0.4,
Px > 0.37 ˜ 0.38,
Px > 0.35 ˜ 0.36,
Px > 0.33 ˜ 0.34,
Px > 0.31 ˜ 0.32,
Px > 0.29 ˜ 0.3,
Px > 0.27 ˜ 0.28,
Px > 0.25 ˜ 0.26,
Px > 0.23 ˜ 0.24,
Px > 0.21 ˜ 0.22,
Px > 0.19 ˜ 0.2,
Px > 0.17 ˜ 0.18,
Px > 0.15 ˜ 0.16,
Px > 0.13 ˜ 0.14,
Px > 0.11 ˜ 0.12,
Px > 0.09 ˜ 0.1,
Px > 0.07 ˜ 0.08,
Px > 0.05 ˜ 0.06,
Px > 0.03 ˜ 0.04,
Px > 0.01 ˜ 0.02,
TRUE ˜ 0.005))
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin = r1_P_perphSlr %>% group_by(PxBin) %>%
summarise_at(vars(PxNew , Px, QtNew , Qt, BuyEqSig , SellEqSig ,
SecMeanVal , SecCmonVal , BuyDlrSig , SigWgt_BuyDlr , Z_WgtB ,
SellDlrSig , SigWgt_SellDlr , Z_WgtS , SecIntp , Del_P , Del_Beta ,
Beta , Xs_P , Del_Q), list(mn=mean , sd=sd))
sink(crFl , append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
cat("\n\n\n")
cat("2 (F) Grouping By Selling Peripheral -Dealer Price Bins:\n")
cat("-------------------------------------------------------\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , PredictedPrice) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$PxNew_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , PredictedQuantity) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$QtNew_mn
)))
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## SD within buckets for PxNew increases with PxNew and not too
## high relatively
########### EqSig AgPx ##################
########################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmSellSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SellEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , EqmBuySignal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$BuyEqSig_mn)))
########### EqCmonVals AgPx ##################
#############################################
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , MeanCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecMeanVal_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SecurityCommonVal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecCmonVal_mn)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SellDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyingDlrSig) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$BuyDlrSig_mn))
)
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , BuyerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_BuyDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , SellerSigWeight) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SigWgt_SellDlr_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Buyer) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtB_mn)))




cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , InfoAsymWeight_Seller) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Z_WgtS_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)
))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedSecurityIntcp) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualPrice , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Px_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ActualQuantity , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Qt_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradePriceEff) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedSecurityIntcp , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$SecIntp_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedTradeQtyEff) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradePriceEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_P_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn
)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedTradeQtyEff , FixedDlrExog) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Del_Beta_mn ,
r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(FixedDlrExog , EqmPriceDeviation) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Beta_mn , r1_perphSlr_gpPxBin$Xs_P_mn))
)




sink(crFl , append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
#sink("C:/Users/hbeeside/Desktop/Dissertation/MyPaper/paperTex/an
#alyses/stub.txt", append=TRUE) ## Start writing to file
cat("\n\n\n")






##b_Z: Z_WgtB; h_b: Z_WgtS; h_p: Del_P; h_db: Del_Beta; h_tp: ##
SecIntp; h_xp: Xs_P; h_dq: Del_Q; h_eqb: BuyEqSig; h_eqs: ##
SellEqSig; h_sc: SecCmonVal; h_sm: SecMeanVal
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_EigCentr , Z_WgtS) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bDat$Ctr ,bDat$h_b)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_EigCentr , Z_WgtS) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(bb$Ctr ,bb$h_b)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_EigCentr , Z_WgtS) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(bl$Ctr ,bl$h_b)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_EigCentr , b_Z) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bDat$Ctr ,bDat$b_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_EigCentr , b_Z) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bb$Ctr ,bb$b_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_EigCentr , b_Z) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bl$Ctr ,bl$b_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_QFacDevn , BuyDlr_EqmPxDevn) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(bDat$h_db , bDat$h_xp)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_QFacDevn , BuyDlr_EqmPxDevn) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(bb$h_db , bb$h_xp)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_QFacDevn , BuyDlr_EqmPxDevn) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(bl$h_db , bl$h_xp)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_DegCentr , QFac) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bDat$bSize , bDat$Beta)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_DegCentr , QFac) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bb$bSize , bb$Beta)))
145
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_DegCentr , QFac) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
bl$bSize , bl$Beta)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_EigCentr , WgtOwnSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(bDat$bSize , bDat$SgWgt_B)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_EigCentr , WgtOwnSignal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(bb$bSize , bb$SgWgt_B)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_EigCentr , WgtOwnSignal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(bl$bSize , bl$SgWgt_B)))
############# SELLERS ##################
cat("\n\n\n")
cat("3 B. Dealer Behavior Within Network (Seller -Grouped) \n")
cat ("=====================================\n\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_EigCentr , Z_WgtS) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sDat$Ctr ,sDat$h_s)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_EigCentr , Z_WgtS) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(sb$Ctr ,sb$h_s)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_EigCentr , Z_WgtS) & %f \\\\ \n", cor
(sl$Ctr ,sl$h_s)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_EigCentr , s_Z) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sDat$Ctr ,sDat$s_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_EigCentr , s_Z) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sb$Ctr ,sb$s_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_EigCentr , s_Z) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sl$Ctr ,sl$s_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_QFacDevn , BuyDlr_EqmPxDevn) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(sDat$h_db , sDat$h_xp)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_QFacDevn , BuyDlr_EqmPxDevn) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(sb$h_db , sb$h_xp)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_QFacDevn , BuyDlr_EqmPxDevn) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(sl$h_db , sl$h_xp)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_DegCentr , QFac) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sDat$sSize , sDat$Beta)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_DegCentr , QFac) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sb$sSize , sb$Beta)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_DegCentr , QFac) & %f \\\\ \n", cor(
sl$sSize , sl$Beta)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(BuyDlr_DegCentr , WgtOwnSignal) & %f \\\\ \n",
cor(sDat$sSize , sDat$SgWgt_S)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(centrBuyDlr_DegCentr , WgtOwnSignal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(sb$sSize , sb$SgWgt_S)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(perphBuyDlr_DegCentr , WgtOwnSignal) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(sl$sSize , sl$SgWgt_S)))
cat("\n\n\n")
cat ("4. Degree of Centrality versus InfoAsymmetry Weights \n")
cat ("=====================================\n\n")
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ByrDegCentr , CntrPtyWgtOnSig ($z_b$)) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(bb$bSize , bb$b_Z)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ByrDegCentr , Mean WgtOnCntrPtySig ($b_z$)) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(bb$bSize , bb$h_b)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(SlrDegCentr , CntrPtyWgtOnSig ($z_s$)) & %f \\\\
\n", cor(sb$sSize , sb$s_Z)))
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cat(sprintf ("Cor(SlrDegCentr , Mean WgtOnCntrPtySig ($s_z$)) & %f
\\\\ \n", cor(sb$sSize , sb$h_s)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(ByrDegCentr , WgtOnOwnSignal ($y$)) & %f \\\\ \n
", cor(bb$bSize , bb$SgWgt_B)))
cat(sprintf ("Cor(SlrDegCentr , WgtOnOwnSignal ($y$)) & %f \\\\ \n











fn=paste(pDr ," eqmPxBehavior.pdf",sep ="")
pdf(fn)
par(mfrow=c(2,3), mar=c(3,3,1,1), oma=c(0,0,2,0), mgp=c
(1.3 ,0.5 ,0))
plot(bDat$Ctr , bDat$h_p ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab=" Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Trade -specific Price Deviation", cex.main
=0.65, main="Trade -specific Price Deviation vs. Eigen
Centrality (Buyer -Grouped)")
plot(bDat$Ctr , bDat$h_tp ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Fixed -Effect", cex.main =0.65, main="
Security Fixed -Effect vs. Eigen Centrality (Buyer -Grouped)")
plot(bDat$Ctr , bDat$h_xp ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Total Price Deviation", cex.main =0.65, main
="Total Price Deviation vs. Eigen Centrality (Buyer -Grouped)")
plot(sDat$Ctr , sDat$h_p ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab=" Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Trade -specific Price Deviation", cex.main
=0.65, main="Trade -specific Price Deviation vs. Eigen
Centrality (Seller -Grouped)")
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plot(sDat$Ctr , sDat$h_tp ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Fixed -Effect", cex.main =0.65, main="
Security Fixed -Effect vs. Eigen Centrality (Seller -Grouped)")
plot(sDat$Ctr , sDat$h_xp ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Total Price Deviation", cex.main =0.65, main
="Total Price Deviation vs. Eigen Centrality (Seller -Grouped)
")
mtext("Plots of Equilibrium Price Behavior vs. Eigen Centrality",
side=3, outer=TRUE , cex =0.75)
dev.off()
###### SELL -SIDE ###############
####### SELL -SIDE ###############
fn=paste(pDr ," eqmQtBehavior.pdf",sep ="")
pdf(fn)
par(mfrow=c(2,2), mar=c(3,3,1,1), oma=c(0,0,2,0), mgp=c
(1.3 ,0.5 ,0))
plot(bDat$Ctr ,bDat$h_db ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Delta Beta", cex.main =0.65, main="Delta
Beta vs Eigen Centrality (Buyer -Grouped)")
plot(bDat$Ctr ,bDat$h_dq ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab=" Quantity Deviation (Delta Beta * Excess
Price)", cex.main =0.65, main="Total Quantity Deviation vs
Eigen Centrality (Buyer -Grouped)")
plot(sDat$Ctr ,sDat$h_db ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab="Delta Beta", cex.main =0.65, main="Delta
Beta vs Eigen Centrality (Seller -Grouped)")
plot(sDat$Ctr ,sDat$h_dq ,col="red",cex.lab=0.8, xlab="Eigen
Centrality", ylab=" Quantity Deviation (Delta Beta * Excess
Price)", cex.main =0.65, main="Total Quantity Deviation vs
Eigen Centrality (Seller -Grouped)")
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mtext("Plots of Equilibrium Behavior of Par -Amount Traded (
Quantity) vs Eigen Centrality", side=3, outer=TRUE , cex =0.75)
dev.off()
.0.7 Python Code for Visualizing the Trading Network
import networkx as nx
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import pandas as pd
from pyvis.network import Network
g = Network( height ="680px", width ="680px",)
g.set_options ("""






















"color": "rgba (255 ,248 ,161 ,0.1)",








"chosen ": true ,
"smooth ": false ,
"dashes ": true ,
"hidden ": false ,
"width": 10,





nde = pd.read_csv ("C:/Users/hbeeside/Desktop/Dissertation/
PythonCode/nodes_9b_1MM.csv")
list(nde.columns)
nodes = [n for n in nde[’id ’] ]
sze = pd.read_csv ("C:/Users/hbeeside/Desktop/Dissertation/
PythonCode/eigCent_9b_1MM.csv")
eig = [100*e for e in sze[’x’] ]
clr = ["rgb({},0,{})". format (255*e,255*(1 -e)) for e in sze[’x’] ]
g.add_nodes(nodes , size=eig , color=clr)
edg = pd.read_csv ("C:/Users/hbeeside/Desktop/Dissertation/
PythonCode/edges_9b_1MM.csv")
src = edg[’from ’]
dst = edg[’to ’]
edge_data = zip(src , dst)
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